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MAP OF THE STATE OF BAHIA  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Bahia has transformed itself from a dozy rural economy to the leading 
manufacturing state of the Northeast during the last three decades. In the process, 
the state government has developed a reputation as a modernizing, fiscally 
responsible administration. However, problems remain. Growth is lacking and 
poverty remains widespread (World Bank 2001b). 
 
Progress in reducing poverty and improving social indicators has taken place in the 
last decade in Bahia. Despite this progress, poverty is among the highest, and social 
indicators are among the lowest, in Brazil. The prospects for Bahia’s poor are 
improving, but more needs to be done to ensure a better life for those who are 
vulnerable. With decisive action, Bahia could continue to build upon its recent 
achievements. 
 
The recent growth of the economy, demographic changes, and macroeconomic 
stabilization have reduced poverty in Bahia. Comparing household survey data 
from 1993 with the recent available data (2001) shows that the number of people 
living in poverty has declined.  More than half of Bahia’s population lived in 
households below the poverty line in 1993; this proportion fell to 41 percent in 
2001, a drop in absolute terms of 14 percentage points over the eight-year period. 
Nevertheless, as of 2001
2, Bahia was one of the poorest states in Brazil. In 2001, 
median per-capita income in Bahia was only R$100, 55 percent of the national 
average.  The fall in Bahia’s social indicators, such as infant mortality and adult 
illiteracy, corroborates the improvement in measured income poverty. 
 
Reducing poverty is one of the central challenges in Bahia. This poverty assessment 
attempts to answer several basic questions about poverty in Bahia. It is a quick 
assessment and is therefore not able to focus on all areas of poverty. The paper 
addresses poverty in broad sense, that is, both monetary and non-monetary poverty. 
A broad view of poverty was wished for when producing the paper, defining 
poverty as unacceptable deprivation in human well being, including not only 
insufficient income and consumption, but also voicelessness, powerlessness, and 
the lack of basic needs such as education, health, nutrition, and security.  However, 
data are not available for all these measures of poverty in Bahia, so for quantitative 
analysis this paper accepts a much narrower definition of poverty as insufficient 
income, education, employment, access to public services, social assistance, and 
poor health. 
 
Given the heterogeneity of the poor in terms of income sources, human resources, 
and physical endowments, there is no single or simple solution. The paper 
concludes that a poverty reduction strategy must include different exit paths for 
different households, via a set of integrated policies tailored to capitalize on 
                                                 
2 2001 is the most recent year for which data from the national household survey are available.   4
heterogeneous living conditions. Policy reforms need to be carried out 
simultaneously in different areas. The policies must be aimed at enhancing 
economic growth and employment, which are key to sustainable poverty reduction, 
as well as targeted poverty alleviation programs aimed at more directly assisting the 
poor. There is also merit to analytical work that serves as an important instrument 
to improve the quality of public policy making and monitoring and evaluating 
public programs and policies to see the extent to which they are meeting their 
objectives and whether their design needs to be changed.  
 
The paper is organized in 8 sections. Section 2 outlines Bahia’s economic and 
demographic development. Section 3 outlines the data and methodology applied in 
the paper. Section 4 addresses poverty, income inequality, and quality of life and 
Section 5 constructs a poverty profile of Bahia. Section 6 addresses the question of 
access to services and assets applying among other types of analyses, incident 
analysis. Section 7 analyzes poverty correlates in Bahia as well as in Brazil as a 




2.  Growth and Demographic Trends 
 
This section outlines what can serve as a base for a poverty reduction strategy in 
Bahia, namely macroeconomic stability, economic growth, and demographics. 
Individual and household assets, in particular human capital and labor market 




The degree of poverty a society might experience depends on the volume and 
distribution of resources and on the size and distribution of the population among 
households. These two basic determinants of poverty, however, are not 
independently determined. On one hand, the size and age structure of a population 
are consequences of fertility decisions taken over past decades that were influenced 
by economic conditions. On the other hand, the volume of resources available today 
is influenced by the size and age composition of the labor force. This section 
analyzes changes in macroeconomic stability, demography and employment in 
Bahia in recent decades. The salient points are that macroeconomic stabilization has 
contributed to poverty reduction and demographic trends have been poverty 
reducing because they have lowered the dependency ratio, and this is likely to 
deepen further in the future. 
   5
Demographic trends, which have lowered the dependency ratio, help explain the 
reduction in headcount poverty (see Section 4).
3 This trend is likely to deepen 
further in the future as Brazil’s richer regions, such as the Southeast, experience far 
lower fertility rates by age group than the Northeast.  
 
In Bahia, the fall in the dependency ratio contributed to poverty reduction. Bahia is 
in the middle of a baby bust. After expanding at 2.1 percent per year between 1980 
and 1990, Bahia’s population increased by only 1.1 percent per year during 1991-
2000 and reached 13.1 million in 2000.
4 The main explanation is the sharp drop in 
the birth rate and some out-migration. The typical poor person lives in a larger 
household with more children than the non-poor. In Bahia, poor households contain 
on average 4.2 individuals in 2001, down 0.4 individuals since 1993 (Table 2.1). 
Poor households have 1.2 individuals more than non-poor households. The average 
number of household members below age 15 is much higher in poor households 
than in non-poor. Poor households have on average 1.8 children below age 15, 
triple those of the non-poor. Each worker in a poor household supports four family 
members. For the non-poor the number falls to three.  
 
 
Table 2.1:     Average Household Size, 1993-2001 
  Avg. Household 
Size 
Avg. # of 
Household Members 
< 15 years old 
Poor 
  Bahia NE Brazil Bahia NE Brazil 
 1993  4.6 4.5 4.4 2.1 2.0 2.1 
 2001  4.2 4.2 4.1 1.8 1.8 1.9 
Non-Poor 
 1993  3.3 3.3 3.3 0.9 0.8 0.9 
 2001  3.0 3.1 3.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Source: Author’s calculation based on PNAD 1993- 2001. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Demographic factors have direct and indirect impacts on prices and poverty. As the size and age 
composition of the population changes, the relative size of the labor force and the number of 
dependents also change, modifying the dependency ratio of families, and therefore their level of 
poverty. This is the direct effect of demographic changes. It captures the effect that demographic 
changes have on quantities: number of children, size of the labor force, and the number of elderly 
people. These changes in quantities, however, will, in general, influence prices in the economy. In 
particular, changes in the rate of growth of the population and in the age structure may have 
important impacts on both labor supplies and savings. As a consequence, demographic changes may 
have considerable impact on the level of wages and on interest rates. Since these prices are important 
determinants of family income, they are bound to have a profound influence on the level of poverty. 
These are the indirect impacts of demographic changes on poverty, which occur through the effects 
of demographic changes on savings, wages, and interest rates.  
4 Data source: Demographic census from 1991 and 2000.   6
Fecundity—the number of children per mother--dropped from 6.2 in 1980 to 2.4 in 
1999. Women’s increased participation in the labor market is an important factor 
contributing to the reduction in the fertility rate, which also produced a sharp drop 
in the dependency rate.  However, fecundity did not fall for all age groups and 
fertility rates are much higher for the 15 to 19 and 20 to 24 age groups in the 
Northeast (0.10 and 0.15, respectively) than in the Southeast (0.07 and 0.12, 
respectively) according to the 2000 Census. Furthermore, the large reductions in 
fertility rates since 1980 were lower in the Northeast for each age group than in the 
Southeast, except for the 15-to-19-year-olds, whose fertility increased, and by far 
more in the Northeast than in the Southeast. 
 
Total desired fertility rate in the state is reported to be 1.9, close to that of 1.8 for 
Brazil as a whole. This would indicate that there is still a substantial unmet demand 
for high quality and reliable family planning services, information, and resources 
(BEMFAM 1998a). Another important development is the decline in the fertility 
differential between more-educated (eight years or more of education) and less-
educated (less than four years) mothers, from around 4 children in the Northeast in 
1980 to 1.9 children in 1998. This differential declined to 1.3 children in Brazil’s 
richer southern states. Hence, again education plays a key role both directly (see 
Sections 5 and 6) and indirectly via the reduced fertility rate in poverty reduction. 
 
In 1970, the number of children under 10 was 45 percent of the population. In 1991, 
it was down to 40 percent and in 2000, 32 percent. At the same time, the number of 
elderly dependents has not caught up. In 2000, only 5.7 percent of the population 
was 65 or older (Table 2.2). According to Rebeiro (2001), these trends are likely to 
continue. This will have a significant effect on the state’s efforts to reduce poverty. 
For the next few decades, the ratio of children to working age population will 
decline, while the number of retirees will remain small. As a result, not only will 
dependency ratios fall, but also the amount the state must spend on expanding the 
quantity of social services will decline. This will free up resources to spend on 




Table 2.2: Age Groups as Percentage of Bahia’s 
Total Population, 1970-2000 
   1970  1980  1991  1996  2000 
  0–14  45.4 43.9 39.7 35.0 32.0 
  15–64    51.5 51.9 55.5 59.7 62.3 
  65  +  3.1 4.2 4.8 5.3 5.7 
  TOTAL  100 100 100 100 100 
Source: SEI. 
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ECONOMIC GROWTH  
 
Bahia was the preeminent region of Brazil in the 17
th and early 18
th centuries and 
until 1763, Salvador was the capital of Brazil. Sugar cane exports were the driving 
force in the economy. The mining boom and coffee boom in the Southeast in the 
18
th and 19
th centuries moved the focus of Brazil’s economy southward. Bahia’s 
economic revival did not really occur until the advent of the so-called Brazilian 
miracle of 1967-73, when the military regime implemented reforms aimed at 
encouraging investment, reducing inflation, and restraining wage demands. Despite 
being a highly protected economy Brazil’s and Bahia’s GDP grew at an average 
annual rate of 8.5 percent and 10.5 percent respectively during 1965-80. In Bahia, 
the key source of growth was heavy manufacturing. The oil crisis of 1979 followed 
by the debt crises caused a downturn in Brazil’s growth and investment. Bahia’s 
economy was hard hit during 1986-92 as revealed by the low average annual GDP 
growth rate of 0.3 percent, slightly above half of the national rate (0.5 percent).    
The Brazilian reform period set in the beginning of the 1990s and revived economic 
growth mainly due to the liberalization of the economy and a successful 
stabilization. Additionally, the federal government has maintained a tight monetary 
policy. Between 1992 and 2000, the Brazilian and Bahiana economies grew at an 
average annual rate of around 3.1 percent. In 2001, GDP of Bahia accounted for 4.5 
percent of the Brazilian GDP equivalent to R$48.9 billion. 
Bahia’s agriculture, services, and manufacturing sectors grew at an average annual 
rate of 3.0 percent 1992-2000 (Table 2.3).
5 Bahia remains very much a dual 
economy where, on the one hand, agriculture contributes only 11 percent of GDP, 
accounting for 42 percent of employment, and manufacturing, and on the other 







                                                 
5 Communications grew rapidly at an annual rate of 15 percent and transport, construction, and 
tourism expanded by around five percent per year. In agriculture the traditional crops (mainly cacao) 
experienced a decline, while new ones (soy, grain, tropical fruits, and  cellulose) emerged, along 
with expanded cattle ranching in South Bahia..   8
Table 2.3:    Sectoral Trends in Bahia’s Economy, 1992-2000 
  Percentage of total,  
2000 
Change 1992-2000 
 (avg. annual percent) 
Agriculture 11  3 
Mining 1  -3 
Manufacturing 26  3 
Public utilities  4  1 
Construction 10  4 
Tourism 2  5 
Commerce 8  3 
Transport 2  6 
Communication 2  15 
Finance 3  3 
Rent 11  3 
Public administration  14  1 
Other services  6  2 
Total   100  3 
Source: SEI (www.sei.ba.gov.br/PIB/pib.asp) 
 
LOCATION STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC AND POPULATION 
GROWTH 
 
Economic growth experienced in the last decades in Bahia is far from homogeneous 
throughout the state. The large regional differences within the state are associated 
with the expansion of economic activities in a few of the areas away from the 
Sertão. Of the 15 zones in Bahia, only four, the East, the Extreme South, Salvador, 
and San Francisco, experienced an above-average expansion of output during 
1980–2000 (see map above). In the past two decades, these four fast-growing zones 
also experienced the largest population inflow of the 15 zones (Table 2.4). The 
largest real GDP growth, above 2.7 percent annually during 1980–2000, took place 
in the capital region (Metropolitan Salvador) where the industry and service sectors 
are particularly strong. The other three regions, the East, the Extreme South, and 
San Francisco, experienced around 1.9 percent annual GDP growth. In these three 
areas, agricultural related crops have expanded rapidly in some municipalities and 
created opportunities for the population, in particular, soy in the East, cellulose in 
the South, and irrigated tropical agriculture around Rio San Francisco.    9
 
Table 2.4:  Real GDP, Population, and Poverty in Bahia’s 15 Regions, 1980–
2000 



























Metropolitana de Salvador  1,766,724 3,021,572 2.72  7,036  14.7  18.1 
Litoral Norte  393,616 530,898 1.51  4,389  16.9  20.5 
Recôncavo Sul  588,527 684,550 0.76  1,890  13.2  24.6 
Litoral Sul  1,122,232 1,360,539 0.97  1,671  14.0  -3.1 
Extremo Sul  456,456 664,850 1.90  4,050  14.4  29.6 
Nordeste 880,296 1,176,201 1.46  2,465  15.2  65.8 
Paraguaçu 963,565 1,250,163 1.31  1,949  13.6  19.7 
Sudoeste 863,207 1,135,362 1.38  1,708  13.0  2.4 
Baixo Médio São Francisco  288,228 407,501 1.75  3,318  18.6  88.7 
Piemonte da Diamantina  450,778 568,708 1.17  1,922  18.1  7.1 
Irecê 274,750 372,994 1.54 1,568  19.1 14.9 
Chapada Diamantina  381,725 507,414 1.43  1,483  20.6  19.8 
Serra Geral  438,544 565,037 1.28  1,884  18.1  20.0 
Médio São Francisco  249,890 337,507 1.51  1,508  26.2  29.6 
Oeste 336,854 486,954 1.86  3,392  19.5  36.7 
Total  9,455,392 13,070,250 1.63  3,376  15.6  21.1 
Source:  Statistical Yearbook Bahia 2001- SEI and Census 1980 and 2000. 
IBGE, Census 2000, available from http://www.assistenciasocial.gov.br/censo2000/  
*Per Capita GDP is  calculated using preliminary data from SEI. 
 
 
The large economic and population growth in the capital zone contrasts sharply 
with the developments in the zones that are mainly in the Sertão and where income 
opportunities are limited, droughts are frequent, and social protection programs are 
few. A large share of the population in the zones that are almost completely in the 
Sertão migrated to the metropolitan area.  
 
Despite the welcome migration from the poorer interior zones, poverty remained 
rampant among families left in these zones. More than 60 percent of the household 
heads had incomes of less than one minimum salary in the poor regions, compared 
to the regional average of 55 percent, or the capital zone’s 34 percent. The share of 
household heads earning less than half a minimum salary also varies across regions 
(Table 2.4). The Southwest region is among the poorest in terms of per-capita GDP. 
However, the headcount poverty is the lowest; only 13 percent earning less than 
half a minimum wage in 2000.   10
This clearly shows that regional disparities in Brazil extend beyond the differences 
between the Northeast and Southeast. There are sharp differences between the fast- 
and slow-growing regions within Bahia. This is very clear also from income per 
capita, which in the poor zones is only around a quarter of that in the capital region. 
However, poverty is not only a rural phenomenon35.7 percent of heads of 
households in urban areas earn less than what is needed to lift the household above 




Most of the reduction in poverty in Brazil and its states in the last decade can be 
credited to national economic policies. Brazil’s macroeconomic stabilization, 
including the devaluation of the real, was clearly the most important poverty-
reducing factor in the 1990s. Increased trade, opening the economy to foreign 
investment, an increase in the minimum wage, and increased access to social 
services and assistance have also played important parts. 
Only the most recent of the six stabilization plans since 1985, the Real Plan of July 
1994, achieved macroeconomic stability and reduced inflation to a record single-
digit low.
6 The poor generally suffer most from high inflation, partly because they 
cannot protect themselves against it because they lack access to the financial and 
banking systems. So, policies that reduce inflation commonly enhance their 
incomes. This applies to the poor in Bahia and elsewhere. Differences in inflation 
among the regions of Brazil are minuscule and cannot be the sole determinant of 
regional differences in poverty, but inflation does affect the overall poverty trend. 
In May 1995 the minimum wage was raised while monthly inflation was about 2 
percent, which may have reduced poverty. 
 
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
 
This section presents some of the methodology used to analyze the poverty and 
quality of life in Bahia, but does not attempt a more comprehensive quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of other forms of deprivation or social exclusion.  
 
The income-poverty measures are designed to count the poor and to diagnose the 
extent and distribution of poverty. The income-poverty measures proposed by 
Foster, Geer, and Thorbecke (1984) are used throughout the report. These are the 
headcount rate (P0), poverty gap (P1), and squared poverty gap (P2) measures. The 
former measures the magnitude of poverty and the latter two poverty measures 
assess both poverty magnitude and intensity. 
                                                 
6 The Real Plan of 1994 (1) introduced an exchange rate anchor with flexibility to move within a 
band, (2) de-indexed the economy, and (3) implemented tight credit and monetary policies.   11
 
The headcount rate is defined as the proportion of people below the poverty line.  
One concern applying the P0 measure is that each individual below the poverty line 
is weighted equally and, therefore, the principle of transfers is violated. Hence, it is 
possible to increase social welfare by transferring money from the very poor to lift 
some richer poor out of poverty. P0 takes no account of the degree of poverty and it 
is unaltered by policies that lead to the poor becoming even poorer. 
 
One measure of poverty that takes this latter point into account (at least in weak 
form) is the poverty gap measures. P1 is the product of incidence and the average 
distance between the incomes of the poor and the poverty line.  It can be interpreted 
as a per-capita measure of the total economic shortfall relative to the population.  
P1 distinguishes the poor from the not-so-poor and corresponds to the average 
distance to the poverty line of the poor. One problem with the poverty gap measure 
is that it will increase by transfers of money from poor to less poor (who become 
non-poor), and from poor to non-poor.  Furthermore, transfers among the poor have 
no effect on the poverty gap measure.  
 
The P2 measure of poverty is sensitive to the distribution among the poor as more 
weight is given to the poorest below the poverty line.  P2 corresponds to the 
squared average distance of income of the poor to the poverty line.  Hence, moving 
from P0 towards P2, more weight is given to the poorest in the population. 
 
This paper sets its poverty bar very low. To define “extreme poverty” it uses the 
indigence, or “food only” poverty line—those with sufficient income to buy a basic 
food basket are above the line. The poverty line is based on the monetary value of 
food items only.  This measure is based on the cost of a “minimum food-basket” 
equal to the FAO minimum caloric intake of 2,288 daily per household member 
(Rocha 1997). Households are classified as extremely poor if their total income is 
less than the cost of a basic food basket. In 2001, the poverty line was of R$80.92.  
 
As most poverty studies in Brazil, no adjustment is made for the fact that young 
children do not need as many calories as adults do. Hence, the poverty rates 
presented in this paper may slightly overstate poverty in Bahia.  
 
The analysis of poverty correlates is based on a multivariate analysis using the 
probit regression techniques simultaneously for Brazil and Bahia. 
 
The analysis in this paper is based on available data: PNADs (1981-2001), 
Censuses (1991 and 2000), IQV (1990 and 2000), Contas Regionais do Brasil, 
Pesquisa Nacional de Saneamento Básico, and other data available online such as 
educational data from MEC/INEP, government spending data from STN/Ministry 
of Finance and various data from SEI (Superintendência de Estudos Econômicos e 
Sociais da Bahia, an autarchy of the Secretary of Planning in Bahia). 
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4.  Poverty, Income Inequality, and Quality of Life 
 
As Section 2 shows, growth is important, but is not the sole component of a poverty 
alleviation strategy. Programs are needed to ensure that the poor can take advantage 
of job opportunities and to protect some vulnerable groups that are not able to 
participate fully in the economy. In order to design these programs, information on 
the poor is needed. This sector addresses headcount poverty and its depth, other 
poverty indicators, inequality, and the quality of life. Due to lack of data and 
information, this section does not address the broader issues of inequality of assets 
and opportunities.  
 
In the last decade Bahia has made creditable headway in reducing poverty. During 
1993-2001, the state’s extreme poverty, measured by P0, fell 14 percentage points 
(Figure 4.1 and Appendix A show P0, P1, and P2 for Brazil, and the state of Bahia 
for 1981-2001). There is little room for complacency, however, because extreme 
poverty is still very high at 41 percent. This translates to over 5 million people who 
still live in extreme poverty, which means that they do not have sufficient income to 
buy a minimum basket of food. This is almost twice the poverty rate for Brazil as a 
whole (21.9 percent).  
 
 















Source: Calculations based on selected years of PNADs in 1981-2001. 
 
 
Poverty did not fall monotonically over the last two decades. The P0 increased from 
40.7 in the beginning of the 1980s, increased before the federal government’s 
implementation of the inflation-beating Cruzado Plan of 1986, increased when the 
plan collapsed, and increased even more during the crisis of 1990 where it hit an 
all-time high of 54.9 percent poverty rate. The P0 embarked on a downward path 
only after the most recent inflation-beating Real Plan of 1994 was implemented and 
the minimum wage increased.  There was a sharp decline in poverty to a level lower 
than at any point during the previous decade. After the Real Plan was implemented, 
the P0 fell 7 percentage points in Brazil. But Bahia managed to reduce the P0 by the   13
Northeast average of around 14 percentage points, which is around twice the 
reduction in the national rate. Since 1996, poverty has remained largely stable only 
being slightly reduced to around 41 percent in 2001 (Figure 4.1). 
 
The fall in Bahia’s social indicators such as infant mortality and adult illiteracy 
during 1980–99 corroborates the improvement in measured income poverty. The 
infant mortality rate dropped dramatically from 95.4 per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 
45.4 per 1,000 live births in 1999 (Table 4.1). Today the infant mortality rate in 
Bahia is among the smallest in the Northeast region and mainly a rural 
phenomenon.  The large advances can be attributed to an improved health care 
system, increased access to treated water (see Section 6), economic growth, 
urbanization, and past investments in education (see Section 6), and other social 
programs. Hence, to further reduce the infant mortality rate in order to reach the 
national average of 35, especially in the rural areas, further actions are called for.  
These include general livelihood improvements such as access to clean water and 
sanitation, high quality education and health care, and a daily caloric intake 
sufficient to cover the basic needs. Moreover, Filmer and Pritchett (1997) find that 
a 10 percent increase in income is associated with a 6 percent lower infant mortality 
rate.  






















Adult illiteracy took the same declining path as the headcount poverty rate and 
infant mortality. During 1980–2001 the illiteracy rate for people over age 15 fell 
20.2 percentage points, to 22.9 in 2001. Bahia managed to reduce the illiteracy rate 
by 55 percent, the largest improvement in Brazil, during 1970-2000. However, 
Bahia is among the 9 states with the highest illiteracy rate in Brazil. Efforts to lower 
Table 4.1:    Illiteracy and Infant Mortality,  
1980 and 1999 
Illiteracy Rate 










  1980  1999 
  Brazil  25.3  12.4  85.2  34.6 
  Northeast  45.9  24.3  131.3  53 
Alagoas 54.0  30.6  159.5  66.1 
Bahia 43.1  22.9  95.4  45.4 
Ceará 45.5  24.8  155.2  52.4 
Maranhão 51.0  23.4  126.3  54.2 
Paraíba 49.3  27.2  170.6  60.3 
Pernambuco 42.2  22.0  149.8  58.2 
Piauí 49.6  29.4  105.6  45.3 
Rio Grande do Norte  44.4  24.2  169.3  48.7 
Sergipe 46.5  21.4  110.9  45.4   14
illiteracy even further are hampered by the fact that the many of the illiterates are 
adults the result of years of educational neglect. Efforts to improve adult literacy 
have been undertaken, but with poor results, because it is more difficult to teach 
basic skills to adults than to children. Interestingly, in 1999, slighly fewer females 
are illiterate than males—24.1 percent of females are illiterate as compared to 25.4 
percent of males. Similarly, those aged 10 and older have on average 4.1 years of 
formal education in Bahia—1.5 years less than Brazil as a whole. Even among 
young adults, educational performance is poor.  The education deficit, including 
that of quality, has a spatial dimension in Bahia. Of the illiterate over age 15, the 
majority  live in the rural areas. In 1999, 40 percent of the rural dwellers could not 
read or write compared to 8 percent in the metropolitan region of Salvador (Rebeiro 
2001).   
 
Life expectancy has increased during the last three decades in Bahia and slightly 
more than in Northeast region as a whole (see Figure 4.2). However, men in Bahia, 
as in many parts of Brazil, have significantly lower life expectancy than women. 
There are no health programs oriented toward men.
7 Other areas of concern include 
the high levels of alcohol and substance use and abuse by men, and the links 
between alcohol use and violence. 















Source: Human Development Indicators.  
 
 
POVERTY DEPTH  
 
Although Bahia has made substantial progress in reducing the share of the 
population living in extreme poverty, the problem remains broad and deep. The P0 
                                                 
7 Health programs—including sexual and reproductive and general health programs—have 
traditionally been directed at women. For example, prevention programs have been established for 
breast and cervical cancer, but no parallel efforts have been made to address prostate cancer among 
men. Similarly, reproductive health programs have tended to exclude men. As a result, contraceptive 
use among men is minimal. Of particular concern is that most men do not report using condoms, 
which puts them and their partners at risk of contracting HIV/STDs. 
   15
measures the proportion of people below a certain poverty line but takes no account 
of how far they are below that line—the degree of poverty—or whether they are 
becoming even poorer. To address the situation of the poorest and to evaluate 
whether their economic situation has improved, the squared poverty gap measure 
(or P2) is used. This takes into account the degree of poverty, because it gives more 
weight to the poorest and most vulnerable. The P2 poverty measure reveals that the 
extreme poverty depth fell 4.7 percentage points to 14 percent during 1993-2001 
(Figure 4.3). As a matter of fact, the squared poverty gap measure reveals that 
poverty was deeper in 2001 than in 1981 (5.6 percentage points), implying that the 
poorest became poorer. In fact, Bahia has performed slightly worse than the 
Northeast and Brazil as the squared poverty gap measure increased by 2.1 and 2.7 


















The income of the extreme poor is stagnant. One possible explanation for the recent 
increase in the depth of poverty could be the drop in average incomes of the 
extreme poor. Data for 1995-2001 reveal that after the launch of the inflation-
beating Real Plan in 1994 average per-capita household incomes fell in all the 
richest northeastern states, including Bahia (Table 4.2). In 2001, the median income 
of the extreme poor household heads (R$40) is less than a fourth of the median 
income of the non-poor (R$180) in Bahia. Moreover, workers in Salvador need to 
work more hours to be able to pay for a basic food basket. Data published by 
Dieese reveal that a worker, remunerated a minimum salary per months, needed to 
work around 140 hours in December 2002 to afford the basket compared to 118 





                                                 
8 Source: www.dieese.org.br. 












Source: Calculations based on selected years of PNADs  in 1981-2001.  16
 
Table 4.2:   Average Per-Capita Household 
Income of the Extreme Poor, Selected 
Years 1995-2001 (R$ of Sep/01) 
  1995  1998  2001 
Brazil 41.28  40.69  39.22 
 Northeast  43.10  42.85  40.15 
 Alagoas  44.38  43.35  40.50 
 Bahia  43.37  43.06  39.93 
 Ceará  43.15  43.29  40.37 
 Maranhão  37.64  39.91  40.20 
 Piauí  37.76  38.33  36.42 
 Pernambuco  45.71  43.37  40.13 
 Paraíba  43.09  44.53  41.61 
 Rio Grande do Norte  45.15  45.30  41.19 
Note: Poverty Line in 2001: R$80,92. 
Source: Authors calculations based on PNADs 1995-2001. 
 
 
Household heads with no income increased during 1992-2001 (Table 4.3). In 2001, 
9 percent of household heads had no income - up 1.3 percentage points since 1992, 




Table 4.3:  Household Heads with No Income, 1992 and 2001 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on PNAD 1992 and 2001. 
 
Bahia 1992 2001
total household heads (a) 2,859,318 3,592,317
            no income head (b) 221,109 322,625
                                 (b) / (a) 7.7% 9.0%
average age 38.6 37.0
average years of education 2.9 4.3
Northeast
total household heads (a) 9,961,578 13,125,390
            no income head (b) 755,077 1,249,656
                                 (b) / (a) 7.6% 9.5%
average age 37.2 36.6
average years of education 3.2 4.1
Brazil
total household heads (a) 24,189,737 49,425,994
            no income head (b) 1,620,561 4,016,608
                                 (b) / (a) 6.7% 8.1%
average age 38.3 38.0
average years of education 3.8 5.1  17
INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
Part of the reason why the poverty indicators of Bahia and those of the nation as a 
whole are worse than in other countries with similar per-capita incomes is because 
of income inequality. Both Brazil and Bahia have an extremely unequal income 
distribution. Moreover, Bahia’s income inequality has not changed during the last 
decade and is stubbornly high. In 2000, the Gini coefficient for Bahia was 0.61, 
slightly below the coefficient for the Northeast region (0.62), and in line with Brazil 
as a whole (Figure 4.4). It is worth noting that international research shows that the 
more unequal income is distributed the less effective is economic growth in 
reducing poverty (Lustig et al 2001). 
 
 























Source: Census 1991 and 2000. 
 
 
Changes in inequality are typically very slow, except during periods of radical 
social and institutional change. Where inequality has fallen it has usually happened 
in association with major expansion and equalization in educational attainment, as 
in Korea and Malaysia in the 1970s and 1980s. Bahia’s expansion in education 
(reduction in education inequalities) may have been too recent to have a significant 
effect on the composition of skills, and occurred during a period in which the 
overall returns to high levels of skills were rising and returns to basic skills were 
falling in Brazil. 
 
 In Bahia, the income distribution reveals that both the top and the very bottom of 
the income distribution receive a smaller share of total income in 2001 than they 
received in 1995. However, in 2001, the top 10 percent of the income distribution 
still obtain 49 percent of the total income compared to the 12 percent obtained by 
the lowest 50 percent of the distribution (Figure 4.5). Education is also unequally 
distributed and international research shows that this can more easily be reduced 
than income inequality. However, research also shows that a reduction in education 
inequality affects the income distribution very little in the short run (Ferreira 2002).     
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Figure 4.5:    Share of Income Per Decile;  Bahia 











Source: Author’s calculations base on PNAD 1995 and 2001. 
 
 
QUALITY OF LIFE 
 
This section presents an analysis of the quality of life in Bahia. The quality of life 
index (indice de qualidade de vida-IQV) is a composite index containing 21 
indicators of socio-economic well being related to outcomes in sectors such as 
education, health, and water supply.  
 
 

























































































































Source: IPLANCE data. 
 
The length of the bar in Figure 4.6 indicates the advance made in a state during 
1991-1999.  Hence, the bottom of the bar shows the IQV in 1991 and the top the 
IQV in 1999.  Great advances have occurred throughout the period and the poorest 
states have made much greater advances than rich states in Brazil.  
 
During the 1990s, Figure 4.7 reveals that the northeastern states have greatly 
improved. Bahia experienced an increase of 29 percent in IQV close to the average 
of the Northeast (30 percent), which is double the improvement in the quality of life   19
in Brazil as a whole (14.7 percent). This indicates that a possible catch-up effect in 
the quality of life is at play in Brazil. 
 
Figure 4.7: Growth rate of the Quality of Life, 1991-2000 
Source: Calculations based on IPLANCE data. 
 
 
5. Poverty Profile 
 
After counting the poor we need to know who they are, where they live, and what 
they do. Comparing average levels of poverty for different categories is useful for 
learning about which population groups are falling behind or catching up in terms 
of poverty. This is useful for the design of policies: we would like to know not only 
whether, for example, more- or less-educated people are more likely to be poor in 
Bahia, but how the relative odds of being poor have evolved for these groups. This 
section traces the evolution of the P0 for various population groups during 1981-
2001. The poverty profile constructed is based on data from the Brazilian household 
surveys (PNAD). The main questions addressed are: (1) who are the poor, (2) what 
are the characteristics of poor households, (3) where do they live, and (4) where do 
they work. 
 
The structure of poverty is clear in Bahia: (a) blacks and mulattos are poorer than 
whites, (b) young households/household heads are poorer than older 
households/household heads, (c) the poor tend to work more in the informal sector, 
and (d) a greater share of those engaged in agriculture are poor as compared to 
industry or services. Furthermore, the deepest poverty is in rural areas, and among 
the poorly educated, and young household heads with children. In fact, since 1995, 
the P0 is actually rising for these groups. Without interventions to improve their 
opportunities and assets, their plight is likely to worsen. The social protection 








































































Table 5.1:                 Poverty Profile for Bahia, 1981-2000 
Bahia  Poverty  Profile  1981 1985 1988 1990 1993 1995 1997 1998 1999 2001
Headcount   40,7 44,7 47,7 54,9 54,6 43,0 43,5 41,5 42,2 41,0
Characteristics of the Head                 
Gender male  40,6 45,4 47,5 54,3 54,8 43,3 43,6 41,8 42,2 40,8
   female  41,1 41,5 48,3 57,1 53,9 42,3 43,2 40,8 42,3 41,8
Race  white      40,4 44,6 42,0 33,6 33,9 34,4 33,0 33,2
    black      51,7 63,7 55,7 42,1 44,8 45,2 43,7 42,1
    mulatto      49,5 57,3 58,8 46,3 47,2 43,4 45,5 43,7
    indigenous       77,6 70,8 38,5  47,8  38,9 23,2
    asian      11,2 0,0 48,0 0,0 20,5 36,8 47,6 43,1
Age <25  33,9 45,6 47,3 59,0 72,0 58,5 64,2 60,9 60,2 63,5
   25 to 45  45,1 48,0 50,2 54,7 60,4 49,6 50,0 48,2 49,5 50,2
   45 to 65  38,0 42,9 46,5 53,4 52,3 40,4 39,5 38,1 39,6 34,5
   >65  35,7 37,6 42,6 56,7 33,3 20,8 24,5 17,1 17,4 13,1
Location urban  32,7 31,4 34,8 43,7 46,7 36,5 37,3 35,3 36,6 35,7
   rural  49,7 60,4 64,4 70,0 68,3 54,9 54,3 53,0 52,4 53,5
Read and 
Write 
Yes 31,9 35,5 37,0 42,5 48,8 37,4 38,1 36,4 38,0 37,1
   No  52,6 56,9 65,1 73,7 65,0 53,5 54,0 52,2 50,9 50,2
Years of 
Schooling 
none or less 
than 1 
51,3 56,4 63,2 71,9 64,1 52,4 53,1 50,6 49,7 47,9
   1 to 4  45,8 53,8 54,8 62,9 63,7 48,2 50,9 48,5 49,1 51,3
   5 to 8  26,3 27,9 34,6 44,0 51,4 39,5 42,7 37,9 41,0 42,4
   9 to 12  8,2 8,3 14,1 17,1 25,3 18,6 18,9  20,9  23,8 21,8
   more than 12  0,2 1,0 2,4 4,0 7,0 2,7 1,8  1,2  2,2 2,3
    NA  25,6 21,2 26,6 67,7 66,7 42,5 0,0 64,3 42,0 56,2
Signed 
workbook 
yes 25,4 28,2 28,2 42,4 41,7 33,5 29,7 28,9 27,8 25,0
   no  55,3 58,4 63,7 71,8 77,5 58,1 59,0 56,8 61,2 57,0
Economic. 
Active 
yes        53,9 56,4 44,9 45,3 43,0 44,4 43,2
    no        59,5 46,8 35,6 37,3 35,7 33,9 33,4
Working yes  41,0 45,6 47,6 53,9 55,4 42,9 44,0 41,3 42,5 40,7
   no  39,4 40,7 48,0 58,6 52,0 43,4 42,3 42,2 41,5 42,1
Work Position  employee  39,0 42,6 45,7 55,9 56,9 42,8 42,0 40,8 42,6 39,5
   self-
employed 
45,1 52,3 53,1 56,5 57,0 45,3 48,7 44,8 44,9 44,6
    employer  5,4 6,1 12,4 16,0 15,0 7,6 3,5 6,7 8,1 8,7
Employment 
Tenure 
<1        53,5 55,2 43,0 44,0 41,2 42,3 40,6
   >1        52,8 52,2 40,9 42,4 39,5 40,6 38,7
   1 to 3        52,2 55,9 43,7 44,4  43,3  42,3 40,0
   3 to 5        48,2 50,4 42,3 40,4  40,2  39,3 36,4
   >5        53,0 51,1 39,8 41,9 38,2 40,0 38,6
Work Sector  Agriculture  51,6 62,6 66,3 71,3 69,5 60,0 60,8 56,3 58,3 58,5
   Industry  32,1 35,0 37,7 47,2 52,8 37,9 35,5 36,9 39,3 34,7
   Service  31,4 29,5 31,6 38,6 43,3 31,3 32,9 31,7 29,9 32,4
   Social  21,0 18,8 23,9 32,9 30,3 20,7 25,9 22,0 20,1 16,3
   Public  23,7 26,3 31,7 43,8 44,0 26,9 25,1 23,8 20,1 19,8
   Other  10,7 17,5 11,2 17,6 33,2 23,2 36,0 38,7 34,4 26,0
Source: Author’s calculations based on PNAD 1981-2001.   21
Blacks and mulattos are poorer than whites in Bahia. The poverty profile for 2001 
reveals a large difference in the levels of well being among different groups. The P0 
reveals that 42 and 44 percent of households headed by blacks and mulattos, 
respectively, are extremely poor compared to 33 percent of households headed by 
whites (Figure 5.1). During 1993-2001, poverty fell 8 percentage points among 
households headed by whites and 14 and 13 points, respectively, among those 




Figure 5.1: Headcount Poverty by Race 
Bahia 1993-2001 
Source: Author’s calculations based on PNAD. 
 
However, there is little room for complacency. As Figure 5.2 shows, blacks and 
mulattos are still overrepresented in the low-income quintiles and underrepresented 
in the wealthiest quintile in Bahia in 2001. 
 
 
Figure 5.2:  Racial Distribution of Population 
by Income Quintile in Bahia, 2001 
Source: PNAD 2001    
 
                                                 
9 For a detailed description of the poverty profiles for Brazil and the Northeast, including Bahia 
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The average income ratio between whites and blacks and mulattos reveals that, in 
the top 20 percent of the income distribution, white household heads earn an 
average 50 percent more than black and mulatto household heads (Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3:   Average Income Ratio of Whites and Blacks 
& Mulattos, Bahia 2001 
Source: Calculations based on PNAD 2001. 
 
 
Education levels are strongly related to poverty. That is, being able to read and 
write is important in determining the likelihood of being in poverty. In Bahia, the 
P0 is 37 percent for household heads that are literate, and 50 percent for those that 
are not. These headcounts are high compared to the national averages of 19 and 39 
percent, respectively. However, while a negative relationship between years of 
education completed and poverty is typical, it is less marked in Bahia and the 
Northeast. 
 
There appears to be relatively little difference in P0 between household heads with 
no education (48 percent) and household heads with completed primary education 
(42 percent). Nevertheless, household heads that have completed secondary 
education are much better off (22 percent are poor) than those with only primary 
education. Of the household heads with more than 12 years of schooling only 2 
percent were extremely poor in 2001, down from 7 percent in 1993. These findings 
indicate that education is a very important key to poverty reduction in Bahia. 
 
The gap in P0 between the educated and less educated is widening: the more 
educated are experiencing less poverty, while the less educated are getting left 
behind. For each level of education (lower primary only, upper primary only, 
secondary only, and tertiary) the likelihood of being poor is estimated for Bahia. 
Figure 5.4 shows that there are very large differences in poverty levels by 
education, and that they have increased over time: since 1995, the P0 for people 
with primary and secondary education appears to have increased, while the P0 for 
people with some university education stabilized at its already very low level. In 
Bahia, as elsewhere, there is a great deal of debate about the causes of these 
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demand for workers with different characteristics, and trade liberalization have all 
been mentioned as possible explanations (Blom and Velez 2001; Blom, Pavcnik, 
and Schady 2001). 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Poverty Headcount (P0) and Education Level Attained, 
Bahia, 1993-2001 
 




The younger the household head, the poorer the household. Data reveal that 64 
percent of the households headed by a person younger than age 25 are extremely 
poor in Bahia. Moreover, it is worrisome that they are getting worse off.  The 
poverty rate for these households rose 5 percentage points during 1995–2001 and 
nearly doubled in the last two decades. This is slightly better than the Northeast as a 
whole, where 66 percent of the households headed by a person younger than age 25 
are extremely poor. However, P0 increased by 22 percentage points during 1981-
2001 in the Northeast region, hence less than in Bahia. Targeted social protection 
measures that relate to youth employment, family planning, and pre-school 
programs could help improve employment prospects of young people (see also 
below). 
 
Elder household heads are far less likely to experience poverty than younger 
household heads. In Bahia, only 13 percent of those households headed by a 
member older than age 65 are below the indigent poverty line—a decline of 20 
percentage points since 1993. Additionally, the latter group has the highest average 
income of any age group, which may be explained in part by pension reforms. The 
P0 of the population groups aged 25 to 44 and 45 to 64 fell by 10 and 18 percentage 
points, respectively, during 1981–01. In 2001, 50 percent of the younger group was 
extremely poor as compared to 35 percent of the older group.  Thus the younger the 
head of household, the more likely it is to be poor. This life-cycle profile of poverty 
illustrates that many households are born poor (mainly due to inadequate assets), 
with some escaping poverty as they accumulate more assets or as their household 
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The age of household members affects household poverty negatively. The more 
young children there are, the poorer the household. Among households with 
children under age 5, 68 percent were extremely poor compared to 50 percent of 
those with children aged 5 to 15. Among households with a member older than age 
65 the rate drops even further, to 15 percent. During 1981–01, the rate of extreme 
poverty among households with children under age 5 rose 23 percentage points and 
for households with children aged 5 to 15 it rose 16 percentage points. The P0 
shows striking differences by age group: it is more than four times higher for 
children under age 5 than for people older than age 65.  
 
Young parents with low income, low level of education, and few assets may also 
suffer poor health. Their children receive low-quality education, and the parents 
have no access to kindergartens for the youngest offspring. Such young parents face 
a high probability of becoming unemployed, and have no access to employment 
benefits or other social benefits. 
 
The difference in poverty rates has gone up over time: since 1995, the poverty rate 
for children appears to have gone up, while the poverty rate for the old appears to 
have fallen. Very young children have the highest—and growing—probability of 
being poor in Bahia as elsewhere in the Northeast region. Currently the percentage 
of poor children under age 5 is three times higher than their share in the overall 
population. There is considerable evidence from other settings that the benefits 
associated with early childhood interventions are very high indeed, especially for 
children from disadvantaged backgrounds, both because this is a critical stage in 
child development and because the returns to any productive investment in children 
accrue over a much longer period of time than the returns to productive investments 
in adults (see Heckman 1999; Currie 2001). This suggests that interventions that 
benefit children should receive high priority.  
 
Informal workers suffer more poverty than formal workers. The P0 for informal 
workers (sem carteira assinada–without a signed workbook) is high, 57 percent 
compared to 25 percent for formal workers. The informal poor, many of whom live 
in the urban periphery, earn a low and irregular income, own very few assets, and 
have no insurance against poverty. They face risks in the form of unemployment, 
crime, violence, and overall economic downturns. Moreover, in the last two 
decades, poverty rates have increased by 2 percentage points among informal 
workers and are unchanged among formal sector workers. However, since 1995 the  
P0 fell 8 percentage points for formal sector workers while the P0 for informal 
sector workers is pretty much unchanged.  At the same time, it should be 
recognized that since very few people work in the formal labor market, social 
policies tied to formal employment or unemployment will have only very limited 
reach among the poor. Social protection policies need to allow informal workers to 
avail of them, while simultaneous efforts needed to be made to encourage formal 
sector growth.  
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Female-headed households are only marginally more likely to be poor than male-
headed households, with 42 percent and 41 percent of female- and male-headed 
households, respectively, likely to be poor. Since 1995, female-headed households 
have experienced no reduction in poverty and male-headed households a marginal 
reduction (2 percentage points). These income poverty figures are, however, only 
part of the myriad of factors that affect a poor woman’s well being. The data do not 
reveal anything about domestic violence and other types of discrimination that 
women often face, nor the fact that women should have higher incomes, as they 
tend to have more education than men.  
 
Those who work in agriculture are far more likely to be poor than others. This 
suggests that productivity in agriculture is lower than in services or industry. The 
P0 is 59 percent in agriculture, but 32 percent among service workers, and 35 
percent among industrial workers. Moreover, the agricultural workers’ poverty rate 
increased by an astounding 7 percentage points in the last two decades as compared 
to 3 percentage points in industry and services. This development pattern is 
different to the one in Northeast region in the same period. In the Northeast P0 in 
agriculture and industry fell by 2 and 11 percentage points respectively.   
 
Historically, poverty in Bahia has been closely associated with agriculture. In 
2001, 52 percent of the extreme poor household heads cited agriculture as their 
primary form of employment. The main explanation for the increased poverty rate 
in agriculture can be traced to migration out of the sector and into services by some 
of the most skilled and, in part, to the structure of land ownership and the quality of 
land and climate.  Rural land ownership is characterized by a high degree of 
concentration of land in few large establishments and a large number of small farms 
with an insufficient area to sustain a family by agricultural employment alone. In 
the last 50 years, the land concentration increased. The area occupied by farms of 
over 1,000 hectares has grown faster than the area of farms of smaller size (World 
Bank 2001b).  
The most skilled agricultural workers shifted employment out of agriculture toward 
higher wage service jobs. In 2001, 27 percent of the poor worked in services, 
mainly in domestic service, repair, restaurants and hotels, and commerce and 15 
percent in industry.   
 
Rural poverty fell in recent years but it is still larger than urban poverty. One-third 
of Bahia’s population lives in rural areas, with limited access to basic infrastructure 
and services
10. The rural poor are primarily smallholders, sharecroppers, and 
informal wageworkers that depend on a diverse strategy of income-generating 
activities in which the subsistence production of corn, beans, manioc, rice, and 
small livestock predominates. In the semi-arid and transition zones, rainfall is 
                                                 
10 Bahia is among the most urbanized states in the Northeast, and became more so during 1991–
2000, with the percentage of the population living in urban areas rising from 69 percent to 73 
percent.    26
scarce and highly irregular, yielding crops of low quality and low income 
generating capacity. These small farmers lack modern production technology, basic 
infrastructure to store harvests to take advantage of cyclical price fluctuations, 
technical assistance to improve productivity, and organized marketing facilities. 
Family income is therefore highly variable and there is little opportunity for saving. 
They have very few assets, including education, and are very vulnerable. Despite 
the limitations, poverty in rural areas has been reduced during 1995-2001 by 3 
percentage points to 52 percent. In the same period, urban poverty remained 
unchanged at 37 percent. 
 
The differing characteristics of the smallholders, sharecroppers, and wageworkers 
suggest that a poverty reduction strategy needs to provide multiple paths out of 
poverty tailored to the heterogeneous cross-section of poor rural households. A 
national study for Brazil
11 suggests that this will involve at least a five-pronged 
approach aimed at: (i) small farm sector intensification, (ii) improved employment 
opportunities in dynamic commercial agriculture, (iii) growth of the rural non-farm 
sector, (iv) migration of the young, and (v) provision of safety nets for those 
“trapped” in poverty. The recommended measures include improving human capital 
endowments, reforming the land, labor and financial markets, enhancing research 
and extension, improving the supply of public goods and services, pricing and trade 
policies, and transfer programs.  
 
In order to increase land productivity and labor-intensive farming, it is necessary to 
facilitate the movement toward farming medium-sized land holdings, in part via 
facilitating land rentals and sharecropping arrangements.
12 This can be done by 
providing more secure titles to land and by the revision of the land legislation so as 
to secure longer-term tenancy arrangements, resolution of disputes regarding 
interpretation, and enforcement of land rental arrangements. The impact of such a 
program would be greatly enhanced by simultaneous adjustments of the labor code 
and of the land tax system. Labor laws have had an anti-sharecropping bias. In this 
context, the experience with the Rural Leasing Exchange in the Triângulo Mineiro 
contains useful lessons that are worth considering for Bahia. 
 
A more direct way of improving farm productivity and revenues is via the 
community-based approach to land reform. Under this approach, beneficiary groups 
negotiate directly with potential sellers of suitable properties, and then obtain 
financing for the purchase of the land and complementary sub-projects and receive 
technical assistance. Two successful pilot projects—the Ceará Rural Poverty 
Alleviation Project and the Cédula da Terra—redistributed about 640,000 hectares 
to benefit about 23,700 households using this approach (about 1 percent of the rural 
poor). 
 
                                                 
11 See World Bank (2001c). 
12 See World Bank (2001c).   27
6. Access to Services and Assets 
 
The problem of poverty and inequality in Bahia largely reflects disparities in 
opportunity. The distribution of key productive assets – labor, human capital, 
physical assets, financial assets, and social capital – is highly unequal. These 
disparities are most prevalent between the poor and non-poor, but also manifest 
themselves differently by geographic area. Also access to services is unequal. This 
section addresses a few of these areas, namely labor, education, basic infrastructure 
services, and social assistance and analyzes the coverage of selected social 
programs by income quintile, which shows the share of the population (or sub-






Labor is the poor’s most abundant asset and it accounts for nearly all of their total 
income. Nonetheless, the poor are constrained in their use of this asset in a number 
of ways: (1) high level of unemployment, (2) a strong correlation between informal 
sector employment and poverty, and (3) black and female workers face probable 
wage discrimination. Table 6.1 shows that formal sector employment has not been 
able to keep up with population growth in Bahia. 
 
The poverty analysis reveals that many workers in Bahia, particularly those in the 
informal sector, are poor (see Sections 5 and 7). The challenge of creating 
employment is therefore to increase the number of jobs that are able to provide 
sufficient income to lift the employee’s household out of poverty or cushion against 
it. Creating jobs regardless of quality is not enough—people need good jobs. As the 
labor market, particularly the informal one, is relatively flexible, the worry is about 
generating sufficient income via employment rather than simply having a job. The 
trend in this regard, as reflected by decreasing real wages of informal workers, is 
discouraging. 
 
The demographic change that demands the most urgent policy response is the 
sizeable growth in the economically active population. During 1992–1999 the 
number of those aged 14 and older rose by more than 3.2 million. Some of the 
growth in the economically active population is from in-migration, but most of it is 
natural growth. The high rate of growth of this age cohort—along with increasing 
female participation in the labor force—means that a high number of good new jobs 
are needed each year to keep pace, and better jobs are needed by those already in 
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Table 6.1: Employment in Bahia, 1992 and 2001 
Total  Total 
Annual 
Growth 
Sector  1992  2001  (percent) 
Industry 659,116 754,809  1.52 
  Formal  432,777  490,871  1.41 
  Informal  23,007  18,133  -2.61 
  Self-employed  174,994  220,279  2.59 
  Employer  28,338  25,526  -1.15 
Services 1,839,542  2,427,415  3.13 
  Formal  845,716  1,190,824  3.88 
  Informal  111,185  103,986  -0.74 
  Self-employed  827,510  1,034,397  2.51 
  Employer  55,131  98,208  6.63 
Agriculture 2,457,009  2,172,201  -1.36 
  Formal  664,786  648,338  -0.28 
  Informal*  835,935  630,093  -3.09 
  Self-employed  921,849  845,377  -0.96 
  Employer  34,439  48,393  3.85 
Other 209,662  313,113  4.56 
  Public sector  145,647  243,343  5.87 
  Other formal  46,347  40,240  -1.56 
  Other informal  -  1,386  - 
  Self-employed  16,740  27,933  5.85 
  Employer  928  211  -15.17 
TOTAL  5,165,329  5,667,538  1.04 
Source: SEI, based on PNAD 1992/2001. People age 10 or older, occupied in the 
reference week, by position in the primary job, by gender, and by fields of activity of 





Informal jobs pay lower salaries than formal jobs during 1995-2001. Informal 
sector workers in Bahia receive an average monthly wage income of R$256 and no 
social benefits compared to formal sector workers that earn R$595 and social 
benefits. Moreover, the informal sector earnings fell nearly 10 percent during 1995-
01. Increased informality could be one of the main reasons why the income of the 
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Table 6.2:  Real Average Earnings, 
1995 and 2001 




Formal 796.1  692.8  -13.0 
Informal 393.0  393.2  0.0 
Self Employed  633.8  533.5  -15.8 
Northeast     
Formal 584.7  533.1  -8.8 
Informal 270.2  268.0  -0.8 
Self Employed  370.5  335.5  -9.4 
Bahia       
Formal 604.1  594.8  -1.5 
Informal 282.61  256.11  -9.4 
Self Employed  419.53  364.07  -13.2 
 Source: Author’s calculation based on PNADs 1995 and 2001. 
 
In the longer term, the slowdown in Bahia’s population growth (see Section 2) will 
affect poverty through its broader effects on the labor market. The rapid population 
growth experienced in previous decades has resulted in an elastic supply of 
unskilled labor. As a result, wage levels have remained low -- except for high skill, 
well educated workers --even in times of high economic growth. Bahia’s lower 
fertility rate will eventually moderate this factor. Declines in the growth of the labor 
force will reduce the supply of labor. This may result in increasing pressure on 
wages, which in turn may prompt the substitution of capital for labor, increasing 
labor productivity, and setting off a virtuous cycle of rising wages and rising 
productivity.  
The state government should support the federal government’s attempts to reform 
the labor code in order to reduce costs of employment creation in the formal sector. 
The labor code in Brazil relies more on a rigid legislative code than on collective 
bargaining. The reform of the labor code is the best way to encourage increased 
formal employment, which should also help reduce the formal/informal divide. By 
shifting that balance, Brazil could reduce labor turnover, increase productivity, 
decrease payroll costs, expand the formal labor market and social security coverage, 
and lessen the reliance on litigation. Possible measures would entail realigning 
incentives for hiring, retaining, and firing workers and relaxing rules, including 
mandated minimum non-wage benefits, to leave more to decentralized collective 
bargaining. 
 
Child labor is still a severe problem in Bahia as well as in the Northeast as a whole. 
International evidence shows that child workers tend to be poor and complete fewer   30
years of schooling than their non-poor counterparts. Children should not have to 
work, but an estimated 250 million children are working worldwide. Child labor is 
one of the most devastating consequences of persistent poverty. Data reveal that 24 
percent of children in Bahia worked in 1999 down from 29 percent in 1992 (Table 
6.3). Bahia is in line with the region as a whole but around 35 percent above the 
national average. However, the majority may be both working and studying. Vital 
to achieving progress against harmful child labor are: (i) effective efforts to reduce 
poverty generally; and (ii) the economic and social policies, programs, and results 
that are the underpinning for success in poverty reduction. But these broad 
measures, while important, take time and are not sufficient by themselves. 
Additional actions focused specifically on child labor per se are also needed such as 
an expansion of PETI (see below). 
 
 
Table 6.3: Child labor, 1999 
Brazil   16.6 
Northeast   24.5 
Maranhão   35.8 
Piauí   31.0 
Ceará   24.6 
Rio Grande do Norte   13.3 
Pernambuco   22.1 
Bahia   24.0 





Education is key to poverty reduction. Increased educational attainment can 
improve the livelihoods of the poor and reduce the likelihood of becoming poor, as 
shown above. More education is also a key factor in obtaining a higher income. 
Furthermore, education is associated with fertility: the more education a woman 
attains, the lower her fertility rate and, therefore, the lower the dependency ratio and 
the lower the likelihood of falling into poverty. Therefore a clear message is that the 
Bahianos need to be brought up the educational ladder to escape poverty. 
 
Furthermore, human capital – education and health - is an important complement to 
labor, boosting its productivity and potential for income generation. Each year of 
schooling yields an increase in hourly earnings. Disparities in education are key 
causes of poverty and inequality. Education is also a crucial elevator for the poor to 
lift themselves out of poverty (see Sections 5 and 7). Higher educational attainment 
for a household head significantly reduces the probability of being poor. 
 
Bahia has made impressive progress in education and in 2002 more than 97 percent 
of children and youth aged 7-14 are in school. Since the number of those under age 
14 is not growing (see Section 2), Bahia has been presented with an excellent 
opportunity to increase access of the poor above 4
th grade and improve the quality   31
of primary education.  Bahia, as other states of Brazil, has seized the opportunity 
effectively. At both the national and state level, governments have raised 
education’s share of the public budget and introduced policy changes aimed at 
improving access to primary education, increasing enrollment in secondary school, 
and diminishing regional disparities. Although progress has been made in 
increasing educational attainment over time, gaps remain for the poor and blacks 
and mulattos. 
In Bahia, school enrollment for the 7 to 14 age group is high and in line with the 
Northeast and Brazil as a whole (Table 6.4). Enrollment of children from poor 
households is slightly lower, 93.5 percent in 1999. In older age groups Bahia is 
ahead. Enrollment for ages 15 to 17 in Bahia is 79 percent, above regional and 
national averages. While primary enrollment rates have sharply increased in the last 
decade, completion is still a challenge.  
 
Table 6.4:  School Enrollment, 1999 
Age  Brazil  Northeast   Bahia 
5–6  70.9 76.9 74.5 
7–14  95.7 94.1 95.0 
15–17  78.5 76.7 79.2 
18–19  51.9 52.8 58.1 
20–24  25.5 26.3 28.1 
Source: Síntese de Indicadores Sociais, 2000, IBGE. 
 
 
School attendance of poor students increased  but they still lag behind. In Bahia, as 
in the rest of Brazil, children from richer households have on average a higher 
school attendance, are less likely to repeat a school year, and have more completed 
years of schooling than children from poor households. Data reveal a strong 
correlation between poverty and educational attainment in the Northeast. The level 
of education of the extremely poor is the lowest, and it is also increasing more 
slowly than average. Average years of effective education of the total active 
population in Brazil increased by almost 2 years, from 4.5 years in 1981 to 6.4 
years in 1999. In 1999, average years of effective education of the total population 
in Bahia increased by 1.5 years, from 3.2 years in 1981 to 4.7 years in 1999 (Table 
6.5). For the indigent poor—with per-capita family income below the indigence 
poverty line—it increased slightly less, from 1.9 years in 1981 to only 3.1 years in 
1999. This shows that school attainment of the poor is increasing fast, but the gap 






   32
Table 6.5:   Years of Effective Education, Total and Indigent   
Population,  1981 and 1999 
  1981  1999 
  Total  Indigent  Total  Indigent 
Brazil  4.46 2.19 6.41 3.78 
  Maranhão  2.57  1.72  4.28  2.88 
  Piauí  2.43  1.56  4.14  2.78 
  Ceará  2.84  1.61  4.75  3.15 
  Rio Grande do Norte   3.48  1.95  5.57  3.69 
  Paraíba  3.37  2.03  5.46  3.06 
  Pernambuco  3.47  2.05  5.36  3.46 
  Alagoas  2.61  1.6  4.67  2.83 
  Sergipe  3.02  1.64  5.42  3.46 
  Bahia  3.15  1.86  4.69  3.09 
 Indig: Below indigence poverty line. Note: Effective education evaluated as years of completed education.  




Students in rural areas lag behind their urban counterparts. Tremendous strides have 
been made in improving access of the poor to basic education. However, 
inequalities remain between rural and urban dwellers. The primary school students 
in rural areas attained 0.8 years less education than their urban peers, but the gap is 
closing as it came down from 1.3 in 1992. The rural poor tend to lag behind their 
urban counterparts in their access to services because of their initially lower starting 
point and greater improvements in service delivery in urban areas. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Average Years of Schooling 
by Decade of Birth, Bahia 
Source: Calculations based on PNAD 2001. 
* “Black” includes mulattos too. 
 
 
Blacks and mulattos have accumulated less human capital than whites. Figure 6.1 
shows clearly that average years of education have increased for both groups but 
the educational gap is not closing. The gap is largest for the cohort born in the 1950 
(2.7 years) and smallest for the cohort born in the 1920s (1 year). Unfortunately, the 
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the gap experienced by the cohort born in the 1960s (1.05 years). It would be more 
sensible to target social policies toward the poor rather than to consider affirmative 
action programs. Yet there is room for special actions to increase school attendance 
and improve the health of blacks and mulattos. In education one option would be to 
introduce schoolbooks and materials that better reflect the reality of blacks and 
mulattos. White people in Brazil live much longer than black people do (data from 
IBGE).  
 
While the quality of education as reflected in test scores, repetition rates, age-grade 
distortion, school attainment, and functional literacy leaves much to be desired, the 
schools themselves and the qualification and dedication of the teachers in the 
Northeast were found to be generally good, though the teachers did not always 
make the best use of school time. This suggests that targeted teacher training may 
be useful in Bahia and the region as a whole.  
 
Table 6.6: State Spending on Education (as share of GDP)
1995 and 2000 
  1995  2000 
 Alagoas  3.4  3.7 
 Bahia  2.6  2.7 
 Ceará  2.7  3.7 
 Maranhão  5.0  3.3 
 Paraíba  3.4  5.0 
 Pernambuco  1.8  1.4 
 Piauí  4.8  5.0 
 Rio Grande do Norte  3.4  5.1 
 Sergipe  4.1  4.5 
 Source: STN (Ministério da Fazenda) and IBGE. 
 
The state government has shown its commitment to improving education in Bahia.
13 
Education spending has been steadily increasing and so has its share of GDP. In 
2001, Bahia spent R$1.6 billion on education, which was 19.2 percent of total 
spending that year, and a real increase of 12.6 percent over 2000. Education’s share 
of total GDP increased 0.1 percentage point to 2.7 percent during 1995–2000 (Table 
6.6 and Appendix B). Currently, Bahia spends a lower share of its income (2.7 
                                                 
13 The progress made in recent decades has been due to increased resources devoted to education, 
increased priority placed toward primary education, increased responsibility given to municipalities 
for education delivery, and a number of federally-funded programs. At present, about half the public 
funding for education is provided by the state, about 30 percent by municipalities, and the remaining 
20 percent by the federal government, usually through programs implemented by municipalities.  
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percent of GDP) on education than most northeastern states. Only Pernambuco 
spends less (1.4 percent of GDP). The states of the Northeast that are poorer than 
Bahia spend up to 5 percent of their GDP on education. 
In Bahia, spending per student was R$637 at the preschool level (the highest 
spending among northeastern states), R$450 at the primary level (a fifth of what 
was spent in the Federal District), R$488 at the secondary level, and R$7,642 at the 
tertiary level (Table 6.7). This indicates a distortion in spending, biased toward the 
higher levels of education and regressive in nature, because far more students from 
the top income quintiles attend secondary and tertiary education than students from 
lower-income quintiles (see also Figure 6.2). 
 
Table 6.7:     Education Spending (Average 
Spending Per Student) in Preschool, Primary, 
Secondary, and Tertiary, 1998 (R$) 
  Pre. Pri.  Sec.  Ter. 
 Northeast  516  465  597  7,549 
 Bahia  637  450  488  7,642 
 Ceará  467  493  631  6,017 
 Maranhão  427  401  505  8,900 
 Paraíba  565  439  696  7,976 
 Pernambuco  524  449  553  5,752 
 Piauí  433  450  600  6,177 
 Rio Grande do Norte  465  659  918  14,451 
 Sergipe  559  529  760  6,697 
Source: Ministry of Education/INEP, based on IBGE data. 
 
The incidence of education varies among the rich and poor and varies for different 
education levels. As Figure 6.2 shows, the share of poor students in the student 
population varies greatly across the different levels of education. The line in the 
figure for grade 1-4 is downward sloping for successively higher income quintiles, 
indicating the progressive nature of benefit incidence in basic primary education. 
The first quintile receives 36 percent of the primary school services. However, the 
benefit incidence of secondary education is regressive, concentrated in the third 
quintile and above. In secondary schools, the first quintile receives only 11 percent 
of the service, and the benefit incidence is highly concentrated in the fourth and 
fifth quintile. Spending on higher education is extremely regressive, with the vast 
majority of students enrolled in public education coming from the wealthiest 
quintile. The 2001 PNAD data reveal that only less than 0.3 percent and 1.3 percent 
from the poorest quintiles and fourth quintile, respectively, were enrolled in tertiary 
education. 
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Figure 6.2:    Incidence of Education by Level, Bahia (2001) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on PNAD 2001. 
 
Bahia lags in preschool and early childhool development (ECD) programs. The 
group of children that has suffered the greatest lack of educational attention is the 
pre-school group. As the legal responsibility for the provision of pre-school has 
shifted to the municipal level, the number of preschool places in Bahia actually 
declined in recent years. Daycare and early childhood education represent a future 
investment in the human capital of the state, and should be a priority over the long 
term. Studies have shown that children who have attended pre-school perform 
better academically than those who have not. Programs have been in place to 
monitor and improve the health outcomes of small children—from early pregnancy 
through the first years of life. Given the high incidence of poverty and vulnerability 
among families with children under age 5 (see Section 5), and given the increased 
economic participation by women, a program of financial transfers linked to early 
childhood development and education centers (along the lines of Bolsa Escola and 
PETI, see below) could be influential in reducing poverty. The federal government 
has recently launched the Bolsa Alimentação, a program of financial tranfers to the 
mothers of children age 5 and younger, linked to stringent prenatal, postnatal, and 
developmental checkups by health professionals. This type of program could be 
linked to and used as the vehicle for strengthening and expanding early childhood 
education and care. 
Policies to improve access of the poor to early childhood development programs, 
kindergartens, and secondary and higher education linked with improved quality of 
education should be the core of the government’s poverty-reduction strategy. 
Furthermore, to reduce disparities in human capital targeting of social policy and 













































BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES 
 
Basic infrastructure services contribute to higher welfare and productivity. Some 
services such as potable water and sanitation contribute directly to overall welfare 
and health status. Others such as electricity and telephones help households use 
their homes productively for income generation. The 2001 PNAD data reveal that 
access to basic services is highly correlated with a lower probability of being poor. 
Inequities in access to such services are abound in Bahia, both between the poor 
and non-poor and by geographic area. Key gaps in coverage include: the rural poor 
for energy and sanitation services and to a lesser extent, potable water. While the 
urban poor have much greater access to all types of services than their rural 
counterparts, a lack of sanitation services for an important share of poor urban 
dwellers raises public health concerns. 
 
Access to public infrastructure services related to housing has increased rapidly 
over the last decade in Bahia. The amount of piped water supplied practically 
doubled (see Appendix C). The access to a sewerage system more than doubled 
during 1991-2000 (Table 6.8 and Appendix C). More households have collected 
waste and piped water. However, the supply of services in Bahia is still lacking 
compared to the national averages of 78 percent for piped water, 47 percent for 
sewerage system, and 79 percent for collected waste. Furthermore, the rural and 
urban service gap is still large although it is narrowing for some services such as 




Table 6.8:  Sanitation Services in Bahia 
1991 and 2000 
 1991  2000 
 TotalUrbanRuralTotalUrbanRural 
 Piped Water  52.2 79.4 9.3  69.5 89.4  24.0
 Sewerage System  16.6 26.7 0.6  34.5 49.0 1.3 
 Collected Waste  41.0 65.2 2.9  61.7 85.6 6.7 
 Source: Censuses 1991 and 2000.       
 
The coverage of water, sewerage, electricity, and sanitation services increases 
strongly with income levels. In 2001, coverage with piped water ranges from 60 
percent for the first quintile to 90 percent for the wealthiest quintile (Figure 6.3). 
                                                 
 
14 Pesquisa Nacional de Saneamento Basico notes that the Census data is likely to overestimate the 
actual reach of sanitation services to households: first, the lack of adequate information of the 
Census respondents about the nature of the services available to his/her household and second, 
exclusion of around 9 million households (nationally) from the Census, which amounts to around 20 
percent of the total, because they are either a) closed; b) empty; c) of occasional use; or d) did not 
answer the questionnaire.  
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Thus, in the first quintile, where only 60 percent of homes have access to safe 
water, 40 percent did not. The rapid expansion of piped water supply can at least 
partly be contributed to the so-called Bahia Azul  program, a state program that 
aims at expanding access to clean water in Bahia.  
 
 
Figure 6.3:  Access to Infrastructure Services in Bahia (2001) 
Source: Calculation based on PNAD 2001. 
 
 
Public sewerage connection reach from 17 percent for the poorest quintile to 58 
percent for the wealthiest quintile.  However, the access to sewerage service by the 
poor increased by 6 percentage points during 1993-01. In the same period, more 
extremely poor obtained access to waste collection, reaching 57 percent in 2001 (37 
percent in 1993) compared to slightly below 70 percent of the total sample. Still the 
access is regressive, slightly more than 54 percent of the poorest quintile have waste 
collected compared to around 90 percent of the richest quintile. Electricity has also 
expanded rapidly among poor households and 76 percent now has access compared 





Recognizing that economic growth and social investments in education (and health) 
will still leave many in extreme poverty, the state and federal governments have a 
variety of programs aimed at reducing economic insecurity and targeted poverty 
reduction.  The programs fall into three categories: (i) those dealing with life-cycle 
considerations such as social security and pensions; (ii) those dealing with income 
volatility such as unemployment insurance; and (iii) those dealing with social 
protection, aimed at improving the well-being of specific vulnerable groups. 
The social protection programs in Bahia include for example conditional cash-
transfer schemes, employment and income generation programs, and programs to 































piped water sewerage system
collected waste electricity  38
programs aimed at building sewerage and keeping children in school. This section 
will describe some of the social protection issues and assess the policies of the 
government in dealing with them. In doing so, it will focus on two major social 
protection programs: the federal-funded Bolsa Escola and PETI (Child-Labor 
Eradication Program). 
The basic approach to address children and youth could be linked to a life cycle and 
social risk management approach to human development. This means moving 
beyond survival goals to issues of basic education, health, social capital and a 
general flourishing condition for development. The well-being of children is more 
than a matter of current projects or interventions. Children are the basis for the 
future health and well being of their communities, and a key to breaking cycles of 
inter-generational poverty. Harmful child labor is an especially strong impediment 
to a future of good health and high productivity (see above). 
It is not only children that confront challenges, but each age group faces challenge. 
Children are among the most vulnerable. The 0-to-5-age-group faces the risk of 
stunted development. In Bahia, public policy seeks to address this via early 
development programs. The education sector plays an important role by improving 
access to pre-school and kindergarten, particularly for the poor. However, given 
fiscal constraints, this group receives low coverage.  
The 6-to-14 age group faces the risk of low-quality education, child labor, and 
sexual abuse. The social assistance programs in Bahia to assist this group are Bolsa 
Escola (to increase school access) and PETI (to eradicate child labor). This age 
group has good coverage, but demands are still not fully met (see the analysis 
below). 
The 15-to-24 age group faces the risk of poor secondary education, including poor 
school attendance, completion, and quality. In addition, the labor market 
participants from this group face the same risks as those in the 25-to-65 age group 
(see below). The same policy responses apply as to the 6-to-14 age group. 
However, the poor from this age group are less well covered because there are no 
Bolsa Escola programs available for them. However, Bahia assists socially 
vulnerable youth via the Agente Jovem program. 
The 25-to-65 age group faces risks of low income, underemployment, and 
unemployment. Job-creating growth programs and labor market reforms are key to 
reduce these risks. Current social policies—unemployment insurance, severance 
pay (FGTS), and the pension system—cover employees in formal employment for 
loss of income or job. Formal sector workers are well covered, perhaps excessively 
so. The group at risk is the two-thirds of the labor force working in the informal 
sector that does not have access to any social insurance programs, except for 
income loss in drought, which gives access to low-paid workfare programs, 
constituting a form of basic risk coverage. The Programa Nacional de Geração de 
Emprego e Renda (National Program for Job and Income Generation,   39
PRONAGER) helps the unemployed to increase their job opportunities, but it does 
not cover all municipalities in Bahia. 
The group age 65 and older faces the risk of low income. The role of social 
protection is to supply pensions to this age group. The contributors to the social 
insurance system (contributory pensions) face little risk because they are insured. 
The role of social assistance is to provide income transfer to the group that is not 
insured. The risk for this age group is currently fairly adequately covered. 
Many of the programs find it difficult to reach the very poorest. A recent study 
found that of the total spent on social programs, 14 percent accrued to the first 
quintile of the income distribution (World Bank 2001). Many programs lack broad 
reach amongst the poor, good targeting, or both. Some guidelines for the design of 
good social programs are provided in Box 6.1. 
Spending on social protection by Bahia is slowly increasing. In addition to the 
federal and municipal programs, the state spent R$107.1 million in 2001 on social 
action programs, a nominal increase of 24 percent over 2000. The share of social 
action programs in total public expenditure was 1.3 percent in 2001. There is 
probably scope to expand social programs. However, this will require ensuring that 
existing programs are well targeted and effective. With this in mind, an assessment 
of three major social protection programs is carried out below.  
Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil and Bolsa Escola. The federal-
financed Bolsa Escola and Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (Child-
Labor Eradication Program, PETI) programs are designed to increase school 
attendance and attainment and to reduce child labor by providing financial transfers 
(grants) to families who abide by certain rules. The target group is children aged 7 
to 14 from poor households. The programs are widely seen as successful, both in 
terms of improving educational outcomes and improving family welfare of the 
recipient families. In Bahia, 1.1 million children participated in the Bolsa Escola 
program in December 2002, around 13 percent of all beneficiaries of the program 
were children from Bahia. The goal was that 117,195 children participated in the 
PETI program in 2002 (no actual data are available).  
One welcome side effect of these two programs stems from the way that they are 
administered. The programs specifically give the money to mothers of the 
participating students. The thinking is that this will increase the likelihood that the 
funds would go to the improvement of the welfare of the family as a whole and of 
the children in particular. This is the first time many of these women have been 
entrusted with this kind of financial responsibility, or have opened a bank account. 
This “official recognition” has also led to a greater recognition and valuation of 
women’s role in the family—including by their partners—and in many cases has 
increased the women’s self-confidence. In field visits by the World Bank, the 
money received by the mothers through the Bolsa Escola and PETI programs is 
repeatedly mentioned by both men and women as one way in which gender 




Box 6.1:  Design of Social Programs 
 
Better targeting requires different approaches for different programs. For universal programs,
such as education, health, and urban services, the targeting of public spending can be
improved without abandoning universality. True universalization of services from which the
poor are mostly excluded is, in fact, synonymous with targeting the poor for service
expansion. 
 
Several principles are useful to follow. First, public spending should focus on spending items
that disproportionately benefit the poor (such as schools, health facilities, and water supply in
poor areas, or education initiatives targeted at reducing repetition rates in school). Second,
some government services could require cost recovery for the non-poor. For insurance
programs, such as pensions and unemployment insurance, contributions and benefits should be
set such that public funds are used only for transfers targeted to the poor. Income transfers and
related programs should be strictly tied to a means-testing procedure. In particular, public
spending for income transfer programs should be focused on the very poorest. Third, often an
effective way of targeting the poor is to provide goods which are not well-liked by the non-
poor, such as a  cheap but nutritious food. 
 
There needs to be rigorous monitoring of the efficiency and effectiveness of social programs.
Demand and willingness to pay serve as the basic guidelines to estimate program benefits.
Investments and current transfers should be compared on the basis of cost–benefit and transfer
effectiveness analyses. Redistributive objectives should not be used to justify bad investments.
Social investments should pass an efficiency test demonstrating that they are more cost-
effective than income transfer programs in bringing monetary or non-monetary benefits to the
poor. 
 
The design of social programs should correspond to the demand of the beneficiary population
and include genuine beneficiary participation. In general, this implies that service provision
should be at the level of willingness to pay. Cash and voucher programs are preferable to in-
kind service provision, unless the latter is justified by better targeting or externalities. In some
cases, a switch from in-kind to voucher financing can be an effective means to increase
transparency, consumer choice, competition, and internal efficiency. Beneficiary participation
in program design, implementation, monitoring, and evolution is essential. 
 
An increasing share of social policy is implemented at the state and municipal level, especially
in education, health, and social assistance. Thus, any social spending reform must include
reforms at the state and municipal level. Social spending reform at the state and municipal
level revolves around three objectives. First, reforms should improve incentives for providing
service to the poor. This could include conditional cash transfers. Second, the responsibilities
of the different levels of government should be clarified where they are unclear. Finally,
reforms must attempt to strengthen the capacity of states and municipalities to deal with
poverty-related issues. 
Source: World Bank (2001).   41
 
Two issues arise in the implementation of the poverty alleviation strategy are 
targeting and institutional arrangements. Targeting seeks to distribute transfers or 
other benefits only to those identified as the beneficiary group in the interest of 
efficiency. The administrative mechanism must not cost so much to operate that it 
effectively absorbs the savings from excluding the non-needy. In Bahia, geography 
is one of the indicators with the greatest value as a targeting mechanism. Another 
good targeting mechanism is individual or family characteristics. Some 
characteristics are closely associated with poverty and suggest the types of 
assistance, which would mainly benefit the poor. Nearly all households, which draw 
their water from wells, are poor. Other housing characteristics closely associated 
with poverty include the use of latrines and the absence of household lighting or 
sanitation facilities. 
 
The magnitude and seriousness of the poverty in Bahia call for the active 
participation of all resources, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
NGOs have several strengths. They can mobilize and utilize substantial levels of 
resources, and they are also able to reach underserved populations effectively. 
NGOs are a strong constituency for the promotion of poverty alleviation goals and 
programs. There are many NGOs in Bahia covering different fields and areas of the 
state. 
 
NGOs also have some weaknesses. They are often vulnerable and have difficulty 
formulating policy proposals. Collaboration with the government is constrained by 
real and perceived barriers. The dispersion of government responsibilities over a 
broad range of state agencies makes NGO entry difficult. Also, NGOs differ as to 
their management and administrative capacities. Some government agencies view 
NGOs as competitors instead of potential executing agencies. Mistrust hinders 
collaboration. The government should establish clear and efficient mechanisms for 
NGO collaboration. Emerging NGO consortia provide one mechanism, which 
should be explored for fostering greater coordination, dialogue, and joint planning 
with the government. 
 
 
7.  Poverty Correlates 
 
The previous sections examine the disparities in key assets between the poor and 
non-poor. This section takes the analysis a step further and analyzes the relative 
importance of these and other correlates of poverty in a multivariate setting, and 
investigates the marginal impact of each individual attribute on the likelihood of a 
household falling below the indigence poverty line, taking into account other 
characteristics. The section analyses the impact of experience, labor market 
association, different levels of education, etc. on the likelihood of being poor for 
Bahia and Brazil as a whole. The status of the household—poor or non-poor—is 
regressed on relevant individual and household characteristics using the probit   42
regression technique. Standard errors are adjusted for the clustering process 
inherent in the sampling procedure of the PNAD surveys (Ferreira, Lanjouw, and 
Neri 1998). To minimize the likelihood of findings being affected by small sample 
biases, data for Brazil as a whole is used in the analysis. Given the way the 
regression model is specified, findings reveal when impacts for Bahia are different 
from impacts for Brazil as a whole. 
 
The analysis of poverty correlates reveals a conditional correlation between poverty 
and characteristics of household heads and indicates groups that are particularly 
vulnerable. The probability of a household being poor is analyzed based on relevant 
individual and household characteristics. The main conclusion emerging from the 
analysis is that disparities in assets – education and labor – are indeed strongly 
correlated with poverty. 
 
Other poverty studies for Brazil as a whole, such as Ferreira, Lanjouw, and Neri 
(1998), show that in 1996 education was the central personal attribute determining 
the likelihood that a household would experience poverty. Other factors such as 
age, family size, race, and rural living are also important in determining the 
likelihood of poverty. The findings on Brazil presented in this section are very 
much in line with those of Ferreira, Lanjouw, and Neri. A discussion of some of the 
variables explaining income poverty follows below. 
 
Another study, Ferreira and Leite (2001), finds that broad based policies aimed at 
increasing educational attainment have substantial impacts on poverty reduction, 
but muted effects on inequality in Ceará.
15 Unfortunately, the authors did not 
undertake the analysis for other states in Brazil including Bahia. However, the 
findings would most likely be similar in Bahia to the findings for Ceará.  
 
It is important to note the limitations of this analysis at the outset. First and 
foremost, the analysis does not capture the dynamic impact of certain causes of 
poverty over time. Most notably, the impact of changes in economic growth - most 
certainly a key determinant of poverty – cannot be assessed using this static, cross-
section model. Second, the analysis is limited by the variables available at the 
household level from the 2001 PNAD. Other factors – such as social conditions like 
crime and violence, or physical conditions such as variations in climate or access to 
markets – could not be included due to a lack of data at this level. Finally, though 
theory holds that many of the variables included in the analysis do indeed 
contribute to (cause) poverty (or poverty reduction), the statistical relationships 
should be interpreted as correlates and not as determinants since causality can run 
both ways for some variables. 
 
 
                                                 
15  These findings are based on micro simulations. 
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Table 7.1: Probability of Falling into Poverty, 2001 
           Probit Regression  Number of obs.    =  44.094 
Dependent Variable: P0  dy/dx  T  P>|t| 
Age  -0,005 -4,42 0,000 
age_2   0,000 2,96 0,003 
female*   0,054 10,44 0,000 
black and mulatto*   0,063 18,52 0,000 
rural*  0,038 5,43 0,000 
family size  0,029 6,35 0,000 
family size_2  -0,005 -11,61 0,000 
family members under the age of 5   0,119 28,16 0,000 
family members between  age 5 and 15   0,101 24,85 0,000 
family members between  age 15 and 24  0,036 11,38 0,000 
family members over the age of 65  -0,081 -6,86 0,000 
Primary education (1-4 grade)*   -0,046 -10,09 0,000 
lower secondary education (5-8 grade)*  -0,086 -19,55 0,000 
upper secondary education(9-12 grade)*  -0,110 -24,71 0,000 
Tertiary education (>12 grade)*   -0,115 -15,63 0,000 
signed work card*  -0,123 -31,81 0,000 
employed in agriculture*  0,103 7,81 0,000 
employed in services*  0,005 0,47 0,637 
Employed in industry*  0,009 0,89 0,374 
Employed in the social sector*  0,009 0,73 0,466 
Employed in “other” sector*  -0,036 -2,18  0,03 
Bahia*  -0,001 -0,02 0,987 
Bahia age   0,000 -0,01 0,991 
Bahia age_2  0,000 -0,06 0,955 
Bahia female *  0,028 1,84 0,065 
Bahia black and mulatto*  -0,037 -3,36 0,001 
Bahia rural*  -0,025 -1,82 0,069 
Bahia family size  0,044 4,08 0,000 
Bahia family size_2  -0,004 -2,75 0,006 
Bahia family members under the age of 5  0,012 0,91  0,36 
Bahia family members between age 5-15  -0,001 -0,06 0,955 
Bahia family members between age 15-24  0,004 0,40 0,692 
Bahia family members over the age of 65  -0,019 -0,74 0,459 
Bahia primary education*  0,024 1,79 0,073 
Bahia lower secondary education*  0,042 2,05  0,04 
Bahia upper secondary education*  -0,020 -1,20 0,229 
Bahia tertiary education*  -0,064 -1,85 0,065 
Bahia signed work card*  0,024 2,13 0,033 
Bahia employed in agriculture*  -0,003 -0,11  0,91 
Bahia employed in services*  -0,011 -0,50 0,619 
Bahia employed in industry*  -0,028 -1,32 0,188 
Bahia employed in the social sector*  -0,029 -1,06 0,291 
Bahia employed in the “other” sector*  -0,030 -0,59 0,553 
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1;  
t and P>|t| are the test of the underlying coefficient being equal to 0.     
Source: Author’s calculations based on PNAD 2001.   44
 
 
Bahia is in many ways very different from Brazil as a whole (Table 7.1). The largest 
statistical differences in poverty reduction between Bahia and the nation are found 
in the effect of education, sector of employment, location, gender, race, and family 
size.   
 
Living in Bahia does not by itself affect the probability of being poor. Hence, 
individual and household characteristics are more important than geographical 
location. This is good news for policy-makers as there are no non-measurable Bahia 
variables kicking-in and affecting the likelihood of a household head in Bahia 
falling below the poverty line.  One explanation may be that the data are adjusted 
by regional prices, which affect the state of Bahia dummy variable (Ferreira, 
Lanjouw, and Neri 1998).     
 
Gender of head of households affects poverty more in Bahia than in Brazil as a 
whole. Households headed by women are more likely to be poor than those headed 
by men. Female-headed households have a much larger likelihood of being poor 
than do male-headed households when other covariates are included in the analysis, 
such as labor market connection and education (Table 7.1). Moreover, female-
headed households in Bahia are 60 percent more likely to be poor than female heads 
in the rest of Brazil. Hence, social policies favoring women, such as conditional-
cash-transfer programs for example Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentação where the 
mother receives the benefit should be strengthened (see Section 6). Furthermore, 
introducing more kindergarten and childcare facilities for poor mothers could 
facilitate poor women’s labor market participation. 
 
The effects of race of head of household are less strong in Bahia than in Brazil as a 
whole. The ethnic background (white, black and mulatto) is another important 
factor contributing to poverty. The probit regression findings show that mulattos 
and black Bahianos  have a higher incidence of poverty than their white peers, 
controlling for other characteristics. However, it is interesting to note that the effect 
of black and mulatto headed households on poverty is much lower in Bahia than in 
Brazil as a whole. One explanation could be that this group accounts for a much 
larger share of the population in Bahia than in the nation as a whole. Family and 
education variables capture parts of the difference found in the simple 
unconditional mean incomes, but still a large part, is due to discrimination or other 
unexplained individual characteristics of the non-white population group. Policies 
to assist access to high quality education and health care for poor families that take 
into account the reality of blacks and mulattos is a key to change this picture in the 
future. 
 
Education is the strongest poverty reduction correlate. All levels of education from 
primary to tertiary are strongly statistically significant and negatively associated 
with the probability of being poor in Bahia (Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1). The more 
education attained, the less likely it is that the household head falls below the   45
poverty line of R$81 in 2001. The impact of having completed grades 1-4 of 
primary education on the likelihood of being poor is the lowest. For high-school 
graduates, the estimated impact is much larger (4 times) than that of grade 1-4 of 
primary education. Furthermore, completed tertiary education reduces poverty more 
than completed secondary education. For university graduates, the likelihood of 
falling below the poverty line is 8 times lower than that of completed grade 1-4 of 
primary education.  Moreover, it is interesting to note that the likelihood of falling 
below the poverty line is much lower for university graduates in Bahia than in 
Brazil as a whole, indicating that highly educated individuals is a scarce resource in 
Bahia and they therefore receive a wage premium.  This is not the case for 
household heads that only partly or fully completed primary school. On the 
contrary, this group of individuals has a higher probability of being poor than in the 
rest of Brazil, indicating that the quality of primary education may not be as high in 
Bahia as elsewhere. 
 
Figure 7.1: Marginal Effects of Attained Education 
on Poverty, Bahia and Brazil (2001) 
Source:  Authors estimations based on PNAD 2001. 
 
Labor market connection is important for the probability of falling into poverty. 
Households where the household head works in the formal sector  were less likely 
to be poor in 2001. In Bahia, however, the effect on poverty of formal sector 
employment is less strong than in Brazil as a whole. This finding is in line with the 
fact that formal sector employment is lower in Bahia than in the nation.  Turning to 
the sector of employment—agriculture, services, industry, social and other— is a 
significant correlate of poverty and Bahia is similar to the rest of the country. A 
household, whose head is employed in the public sector, is richer than one whose 
head is employed in the private sector. Additionally, household heads working in 
agriculture are 10 times more likely to be poor than household heads working in 
services and industry.   
 
Age of head of household and its members. The older the head of the household, the 
lower the probability the household will be poor, albeit at a decreasing rate (Table 
7.1). Households with young children are the most poverty prone; households with 
old people are the least. In Bahia and Brazil, families with children younger than 5 
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appear more likely to be poor than families with no such children. One direct policy 
intervention would be to facilitate access to childcare. The poor find the shortage of 
affordable childcare a large obstacle to their daily chores. The gender finding paired 
with this small children finding indicates that single mothers with small children are 
far more likely to experience poverty than, for example, male-headed households 
with no children. 
 
The likelihood of extreme poverty for households with youth members (aged 15 to 
24) is much lower than for those with children younger than five, but it is still high. 
Additionally, this finding pared with the above-mentioned finding that young 
household heads are much more likely to experience poverty indicates that the 
youth is at considerable risk of poverty in Bahia. The lower likelihood of extreme 
poverty for households with a member older than 65 may be due to the fact that 
many of the elderly receive a pension, which would increase household income.  
 
Size of household. Family characteristics, such as household size, are positively 
correlated with the incidence of poverty. Hence, the larger the household, the more 
poverty prone it is. Moreover, larger households are poorer and the effect is 
concave, indicating that a scaling factor matters for poverty.  Finally, the finding for 
Bahia is not different to the rest of Brazil, as large families in Bahia are not more 
likely to experience poverty than large households in Brazil as a whole. 
 
Rural living is a significant correlate to poverty.  This is in line with what we 
observed earlier in the descriptive statistics. Hence, the deep rural poverty in Bahia 
and Brazil is not only due to lower education achievements and skill levels. The 
households located in rural Bahia are less likely to experience poverty than in the 
rest of Brazil, which may indicate that rural dwellers in Bahia have developed 
coping strategies such as migration to urban area during drought periods. Policy 
interventions that facilitate poor rural people’s access to basic services and 
expanding high quality rural education are central to poverty reduction in Bahia.  
 
Although these findings help improve our understanding of the determinants of 
poverty, they do not all lead to policy recommendations.  Some findings such as  
those on race and gender are difficult to address, especially at the state level.
16 
However, many of these findings can assist in the formulation of poverty reduction 
recommendations and strategy in Bahia. The location and education findings should 
be reflected in the infrastructure and education policies respectively, while health 
policies relating to improving family planning and infant mortality should result in 
lower household sizes with fewer young children. Also, some of the social 
protection policies should be targeted at the vulnerable as identified in this section. 
 
                                                 
16 Moreover, the findings on race could be slightly biased—the non-poor in Brazil have a tendency 
to classify themselves as white. 
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8.  Poverty-Reduction Strategy for Bahia  
 
Over the medium to long run what is needed to alleviate the high levels of poverty 
is broad-based growth. However, this is not enough to alleviate poverty, particularly 
in the short run. Measures are needed to protect vulnerable groups and to ensure 
that the poor are able to take advantage of the greater opportunities in the economy. 
In order to address these latter needs, this paper has examined the profile of the 
poor in Bahia and recommended priority policies and programs targeted to them.  
 
The government of Bahia has taken important steps to reduce poverty, for example 
the recent generation of SECOMP (the Secretariat of Poverty Reduction) and the 
conduction of poverty related research by SEI are encouraging signs. However, it 
needs a poverty alleviation strategy that sets clear and appropriate priorities and 
goals for poverty reduction efforts within a framework of a continuation of 
economic policies that would promote growth. The challenge and test of the 
government’s resolve will be to what extent current and future policies and 
programs are governed by that strategy. In order to ensure that the poor reap the 
benefits, poverty measurement and monitoring are called for, including tracking 
changes and making appropriate adjustments in existing programs to reflect these 
changes.  
 
A SIX-PRONGED POVERTY-REDUCTION APPROACH FOR BAHIA 
 
The poverty profile, determinants of poverty, and social risk and incidence analysis 
provide guidance on a social agenda and poverty alleviation strategy for Bahia.
17 
The strategic principles for reducing poverty involve seeking to strengthen the key 
assets of the poor, taking into account geographic differences in the poverty 
situation and priorities. The government of Bahia could apply a six-pronged 
poverty-reduction approach:
18 
                                                 
17 It is worth to keep in mind that this paper is a fast assessment of poverty in Bahia and does by no 
means capture all areas of poverty in the state. Further research include: public expenditure analysis 
(incidence and management), the links between poverty, rural and urban living, health, and the 
environment, impact evaluations of social assistance programs, participatory research on the 
obstacles to increased school enrollment among black and mulatto children, and participatory 
research on poverty, crime and violence. 
 
 
18 Some key steps for immediate action could include: (1) conducting a thorough review of public 
expenditure allocations and developing proposals for reallocating expenditures such that they better 
reach the poor; (2) developing a set of indicators to monitor implementation of poverty reduction 
interventions (including key budget categories) and agreeing on an inter-institutional process for 
reporting on such indicators and implementation; and (3) applying a poverty map as a tool for 
targeting and resource allocation.   48
 
First,  targeted programs should focus on the extreme poor and prioritize 
among groups. Given the distribution of poverty, first priority should be given to: 
female-headed households with young children, blacks and mulattos, people with or 
at risk for low education attainment, and the rural poor. Second priority should be 
assigned to programs that target the poor informal-sector workers and the poor 
unemployed. Improvements in social policies and access to public services are 
needed to reduce extreme poverty for these groups. 
 
  The gender finding paired with the young children finding indicates that 
single mothers with small children are far more likely to experience poverty 
than, for example, male-headed households with no children. Social policies 
favoring women should be expanded, for example: (1) conditional-cash-
transfer programs where the mother receives the benefit, and (2) more 
kindergarten and childcare facilities for poor mothers could facilitate poor 
women’s labor market participation.  
 
  Blacks and mulattos are poorer than whites taking into account  individual 
attributes and other characteristics. It would be more sensible to target social 
policies toward the poor rather than to consider affirmative action programs. 
Yet there is room for special actions to increase school attendance and 
improve the health of blacks and mulattos. In education one option would be 
to introduce schoolbooks and materials that better reflect the reality of 
blacks and mulattos. In health, one option would be to give more attention 
to specific illnesses of black people, including training health staff in 
attending the special needs of the black population. Additionally, efforts to 
increase racial integration are called for.  
 
  Extremely poor households are at great risk for poor or low human capital 
accumulation that includes poor health and undesired pregnancies because 
they lack access to family planning and clean water and sanitation facilities. 
They are also at risk for low-quality education and education attainment. 
Increased quality education and educational attainment can reduce the 
likelihood of becoming poor, as more education is a key factor in obtaining 
a higher income. Furthermore, education is associated with fertility: the 
more education a woman attains, the lower her fertility rate and, therefore, 
the lower the dependency ratio and the lower the likelihood of falling into 
poverty. It is clear that the Bahianos need to be brought up the educational 
ladder to escape poverty. One approach would be to increase: (1) access to 
early childhood development and daycare programs, (2) access of poor 
people to programs of financial transfers linked to early childhood 
development and secondary and higher education, and (3) the quality of 
education. 
 
  The differing characteristics of  poor rural  households call for multiple 
paths out of poverty aimed at: (i) small farm sector intensification, (ii)   49
improved employment opportunities in dynamic commercial agriculture, 
(iii) growth of the rural non-farm sector, (iv) migration of the young, and (v) 
provision of safety nets for those “trapped” in poverty.  The recommended 
measures include improving human capital endowments, reforming the land, 
labor and financial markets, enhancing research and extension, improving 
the supply of public goods and services, pricing and trade policies, and 
transfer programs. 
 
  Other households are poor because they are either in low-paying, low-
productivity jobs in the informal sector or unemployed. They need more 
productive jobs to raise their income above the poverty level and become 
well equipped to take advantage of employment opportunities. It should be 
recognized that since very few people work in the formal labor market, 
social policies tied to formal employment or unemployment will have only 
very limited reach among the poor. Social protection policies need to allow 
informal workers to avail of them, while simultaneous efforts need to be 
made to encourage formal sector growth and that may include liberalization 
of the labor market. Hence, the state government should support federal 
government initiatives to reform the labor code in order to reduce costs of 
employment creation in the formal sector. Possible measures would entail: 
(1) realigning incentives for hiring, retaining, and firing workers, and (2) 
relaxing rules, including mandated minimum non-wage benefits, to leave 
more to decentralized collective bargaining, and (3) targeted social 
protection measures that relate to informal sector and youth employment. 
 
Second, reallocate public expenditures and promote community participation 
in service delivery. The top priority for effective action to reduce poverty should 
involve reallocating public expenditures. The government needs to reallocate 
existing spending toward areas that benefit the poor, boost cost recovery for 
services used by the non-poor, and improve efficiency in service delivery. A 
thorough review of public spending should be conducted to provide guidance on 
such reallocations. Clear candidates for reallocation of education spending include: 
(i) enforcing higher cost recovery for higher education and shifting freed resources 
toward basic education, kindergarten, and early childhood development; (ii) 
focusing spending on demand-side education schemes to reduce economic barriers 
faced by poor households to increase enrollment by the poor in secondary and 
tertiary education. Spending on social insurance and assistance should also be 
streamlined to ensure a comprehensive, efficient, well-targeted safety net. An 
inventory of service coverage should be overlayed with a poverty map to guide 
spending allocations on basic services so as to target key gaps among the poor. 
Promotion of community participation in service delivery is important to expand 
social programs and respond to community preferences for service delivery. 
 
Third,  implement key policy reforms to reduce disparities in assets. Special 
efforts should be made to ensure that key reforms to reduce disparities in assets, and 
hence poverty, are undertaken including: (i) supporting the federal government   50
attempt to reform of the labor code; (ii) expanding house and land property titling; 
and (3) ensuring access to high-quality secondary and higher education for students 
from poor households. 
 
Fourth, improve targeting mechanisms.  The government should apply a poverty 
map to the allocation of expenditures. It should also seek to develop additional 
mechanisms for targeting, including means-testing and self-targeting. 
 
Fifth, allocate resources to monitor poverty and evaluate the implementation of 
poverty reduction interventions.  The government needs to develop a poverty 
monitoring system to track living conditions and provide data for impact evaluation 
of interventions. The government should also seek to develop a key set of indicators 
for monitoring actions to reduce poverty. 
 
Sixth,  increase sectoral integration. For the poverty-reduction strategy to be 
effective, a high level of sectoral integration is needed at all levels of government. It 
is of utmost importance that the Secretariats of Planning and Poverty Reduction 
work extremely closely together so that all changes in poverty indicators, etc. are 
reflected in the social programs in Bahia.   51
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Poverty Indices Based on PNAD 1981-2001 
P0  1981 1985 1988 1990 1993 1995 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Brazil  24,4 26,0 25,1 30,3 29,7 21,8 21,9 21,6 22,4 21,9 
NE  49,8 51,9 51,9 58,7 56,7 44,6 46,1 43,5 44,3 42,3 
São  Paulo  6,6 8,3 6,5 8,8  12,5  7,1 7,4 7,8 8,6 9,4 
Maranhão  64,0 62,8 56,1 64,5 65,4 54,4 58,2 54,1 52,0 48,4 
Piauí  69,3 69,8 68,1 71,5 62,1 51,6 57,6 50,2 51,8 45,1 
Ceará  59,1 58,6 58,0 65,8 57,5 47,2 47,6 45,2 46,7 42,4 
Rio Grande do 
Norte 
49,4 55,7 47,7 57,0 54,5 40,4 39,8 38,3 39,7 36,2 
Paraíba  58,3 57,0 57,4 60,7 56,9 40,8 42,9 40,5 39,4 42,9 
Pernambuco  40,8 44,5 45,4 51,8 53,9 39,5 42,5 39,7 41,6 40,6 
Alagoas  42,8 45,7 49,5 59,7 58,5 46,2 45,9 44,1 47,2 48,0 
Sergipe  46,2 46,3 48,9 50,3 47,5 41,5 40,7 38,0 41,4 38,1 
Bahia  40,7 44,7 47,7 54,9 54,6 43,0 43,5 41,5 42,2 41,0 
            
P1  1981 1985 1988 1990 1993 1995 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Brazil  9,7  10,5 10,5 13,0 14,5 10,6 11,0 10,6 10,8 11,1 
NE  22,0 23,8 24,1 28,5 30,0 21,4 22,4 20,7 21,2 21,6 
São  Paulo  2,0 2,6 2,1 2,7 5,8 4,4 4,8 4,6 4,8 5,6 
Maranhão  31,1 29,7 26,4 34,2 37,5 28,9 31,5 27,2 24,2 24,5 
Piauí  37,1 40,7 40,0 42,2 35,4 27,4 29,8 26,4 26,4 24,8 
Ceará  27,9 27,9 28,1 33,1 30,2 23,0 23,1 21,9 22,7 21,9 
Rio Grande do 
Norte 
21,7 26,5 21,7 28,1 27,5 17,9 19,2 16,9 19,0 17,9 
Paraíba  27,1 27,3 28,2 30,6 30,9 19,0 21,1 18,2 19,4 21,1 
Pernambuco  16,1 19,2 19,9 23,0 28,0 17,4 20,0 18,5 20,0 20,9 
Alagoas  16,8 17,8 20,9 25,4 31,0 20,9 21,7 20,6 21,8 24,1 
Sergipe  18,3 18,8 20,9 20,8 23,6 19,8 20,5 18,0 20,0 19,0 
Bahia  16,2 18,7 20,5 25,7 27,9 20,4 19,9 19,5 19,8 20,9 
            
P2  1981 1985 1988 1990 1993 1995 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Brazil  5,2 5,7 6,0 7,4 9,8 7,2 7,7 7,3 7,5 7,9 
NE  12,5 13,8 14,5 17,3 20,6 14,0 14,9 13,5 13,8 14,6 
São  Paulo  0,9 1,3 1,0 1,3 4,1 3,7 4,1 3,9 4,0 4,6 
Maranhão  19,0 17,6 15,9 22,1 26,8 19,7 21,8 17,9 14,9 16,1 
Piauí  24,2 28,3 28,3 29,7 25,6 19,1 20,5 17,7 17,7 17,5 
Ceará  16,4 16,4 17,1 20,5 21,0 15,2 15,4 14,3 15,2 14,8 
Rio Grande do 
Norte 
11,9 15,7 12,7 16,9 18,2 11,2 13,2 10,6 12,6 11,9 
Paraíba  15,7 16,2 17,5 19,2 21,6 12,3 14,1 11,4 12,7 13,8 
Pernambuco  8,4  10,8 11,5 13,1 19,3 11,0 13,3 12,3 13,4 14,5 
Alagoas  8,8  9,0  11,9 13,8 20,9 13,1 14,9 13,3 13,5 16,1 
Sergipe  9,5  10,0 11,6 11,1 15,3 13,1 14,1 12,1 13,5 13,0 
Bahia  8,4  10,1 11,6 15,0 18,7 13,2 12,7 12,7 12,8 14,0 




Education and Culture Spending (nominal R$ million)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Brazil 14,371.2 17,172.4 15,981.6 22,872.9 24,758.3 27,962.2 32,576.8
North 1,101.2 1,278.1 1,338.1 1,657.5 1,564.1 1,916.2 2,287.7
Rondônia 109.9 123.1 150.7 164.6 181.5 226.3 253.0
Acre 82.6 97.7 112.0 169.3 129.8 183.4 201.7
Amazonas 231.9 300.5 308.1 320.6 316.9 454.3 529.3
Roraima 59.8 68.7 85.1 105.5 97.5 130.5 158.2
Pará 343.1 425.6 433.2 603.0 525.6 533.1 663.0
Amapá 165.2 122.7 103.7 127.2 129.4 153.8 185.6
Tocantins 108.7 139.7 145.2 167.2 183.4 235.0 296.9
Northeast 2,373.0 2,684.1 3,196.0 4,103.8 4,403.8 4,518.1 6,176.6
Maranhão 255.5 323.2 287.1 293.2 350.2 301.2 695.4
Piauí 152.1 192.8 171.2 190.3 276.9 264.2 350.2
Ceará 342.1 292.6 440.0 597.2 609.1 763.6 1,123.3
Rio Grande do Norte 162.5 190.1 224.5 390.9 407.5 471.6 575.2
Paraíba 180.4 237.4 259.3 379.2 418.5 459.3 604.6
Pernambuco 316.0 335.7 448.8 559.3 526.0 413.8 527.8
Alagoas 136.3 154.9 118.7 179.5 227.6 261.0 320.4
Sergipe 143.7 162.3 159.9 208.7 218.6 264.6 353.0
Bahia 684.3 795.2 1,086.5 1,305.4 1,369.4 1,318.9 1,626.8
Southeast 7,622.6 8,809.6 7,128.3 11,872.2 12,844.8 14,994.0 17,474.2
Minas Gerais 1,703.1 1,860.2 1,976.2 3,104.3 2,797.8 3,324.3 3,528.5
Espírito Santo 216.2 240.6 249.3 460.9 439.0 301.7 353.1
Rio de Janeiro 1,429.8 1,559.9 1,268.4 2,245.8 3,184.4 3,722.7 3,114.3
São Paulo 4,273.5 5,148.9 3,634.4 6,061.1 6,423.5 7,645.3 10,478.2
South 1,896.3 2,871.1 2,659.0 3,436.3 3,299.4 4,169.8 3,995.3
Paraná 868.2 1,104.5 1,239.9 1,840.5 1,712.2 1,357.1 1,492.5
Santa Catarina 395.7 495.6 497.1 479.9 458.2 803.8 923.7
Rio Grande do Sul 632.3 1,270.9 922.0 1,115.9 1,128.9 2,008.9 1,579.0
Center-West 1,378.1 1,529.4 1,660.2 1,803.1 2,646.3 2,364.1 2,643.1
Mato Grosso do Sul 180.7 230.2 167.7 290.4 339.5 468.4 479.0
Mato Grosso  285.3 231.2 297.5 274.2 385.8 332.9 335.0
Goiás 294.6 385.2 392.8 492.4 484.2 596.3 808.3
Distrito Federal 617.5 682.8 802.2 746.1 1,436.8 966.5 1,020.8
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Education and Culture Spending (%GDP)      
   1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Brazil TOTAL 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 na
North  N  3.7 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.6 3.8 na
Rondônia RO  3.7 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.0 na
Acre AC  8.3 8.5 8.5 11.6 8.3 10.8 na
Amazonas AM  2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.4 na
Roraima RR  12.7 12.6 13.7 14.1 11.9 11.7 na
Pará PA  2.8 3.1 2.9 3.9 3.2 2.8 na
Amapá AP  13.4 9.2 6.8 8.5 8.2 7.8 na
Tocantins TO  8.9 9.1 8.4 8.6 8.7 9.6 na
Northeast  NE  2.9 2.6 2.8 3.4 3.4 3.1 na
Maranhão MA  5.0 4.7 3.9 4.1 4.4 3.3 na
Piauí PI  4.8 4.9 4.1 4.3 5.8 5.0 na
Ceará CE  2.7 1.9 2.5 3.2 3.1 3.7 na
Rio Grande do Norte  RN  3.4 3.2 3.4 5.7 5.3 5.1 na
Paraíba PB  3.4 3.6 3.7 5.2 5.3 5.0 na
Pernambuco PE  1.8 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.4 na
Alagoas AL  3.4 3.1 2.1 2.9 3.5 3.7 na
Sergipe SE  4.1 3.8 3.3 4.1 4.0 4.5 na
Bahia BA  2.6 2.4 2.9 3.4 3.3 2.7 na
Southeast  SE  2.0 1.9 1.4 2.2 2.3 2.4 na
Minas Gerais  MG  2.7 2.4 2.3 3.5 3.0 3.1 na
Espírito Santo  ES  1.7 1.6 1.5 2.7 2.3 1.4 na
Rio de Janeiro  RJ  1.9 1.8 1.3 2.2 2.8 2.7 na
São Paulo  SP  1.9 1.9 1.2 1.9 1.9 2.1 na
South  S  1.6 2.0 1.7 2.2 1.9 2.2 na
Paraná PR  2.3 2.3 2.3 3.2 2.8 2.1 na
Santa Catarina  SC  1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.9 na
Rio Grande do Sul  RS  1.2 2.0 1.3 1.6 1.5 2.4 na
Center-West  CO  3.6 3.2 3.1 2.9 4.2 3.1 na
Mato Grosso do Sul  MS  2.6 2.8 1.8 2.9 3.1 3.9 na
Mato Grosso   MT  4.4 2.9 3.2 2.8 3.3 2.5 na
Goiás GO  2.5 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.8 na
Distrito Federal  DF  4.7 4.1 4.0 3.0 6.5 3.3 na
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Education and Culture Spending (%Total Spending)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Brazil 16.8 16.8 10.0 16.0 17.8 18.5 19.0
North 19.1 19.1 19.9 19.3 19.6 20.3 19.7
Rondônia 16.7 18.6 21.5 11.2 20.6 19.7 19.5
Acre 17.1 21.4 22.0 26.6 19.2 23.3 21.6
Amazonas 13.3 15.0 17.1 16.7 15.7 20.0 16.4
Roraima 20.9 21.3 21.5 24.6 22.3 21.0 22.7
Pará 22.8 22.6 20.9 21.6 20.2 18.7 19.6
Amapá 28.4 25.6 23.9 27.2 25.5 26.1 24.0
Tocantins 20.9 15.9 18.5 19.4 21.0 20.3 22.5
Northeast 17.9 16.2 16.8 15.7 17.9 17.9 19.0
Maranhão 24.6 22.8 23.2 21.1 16.5 13.9 23.5
Piauí 18.0 20.3 16.1 17.2 23.5 21.4 22.3
Ceará 17.5 12.4 16.1 17.3 12.5 19.4 21.4
Rio Grande do Norte 19.5 17.9 16.0 20.0 23.5 24.1 25.1
Paraíba 19.5 21.6 21.2 23.6 24.3 23.9 23.7
Pernambuco 14.6 12.2 15.9 11.0 14.9 8.8 8.4
Alagoas 19.9 12.4 14.4 17.8 17.6 17.4 22.1
Sergipe 16.9 15.6 11.7 13.1 15.9 18.0 20.6
Bahia 17.1 17.1 17.2 14.4 20.2 20.7 19.2
Southeast 16.4 16.7 6.9 16.6 18.5 19.3 20.4
Minas Gerais 18.0 19.7 16.4 19.9 28.5 22.9 20.7
Espírito Santo 10.3 9.9 9.3 14.4 14.6 8.8 9.8
Rio de Janeiro 18.1 15.0 10.4 16.3 19.9 22.5 17.5
São Paulo 15.8 16.8 4.7 15.6 15.9 17.7 22.2
South 15.0 16.9 13.7 13.9 13.8 16.3 15.8
Paraná 25.1 24.3 22.0 22.1 15.3 13.9 16.6
Santa Catarina 15.1 12.4 12.0 13.6 12.1 14.4 18.6
Rio Grande do Sul 9.6 15.1 9.6 8.7 12.7 19.7 13.9
Center-West 18.7 16.7 16.4 15.4 19.7 17.6 16.5
Mato Grosso do Sul 17.5 16.3 11.2 16.2 21.1 23.0 20.2
Mato Grosso  18.8 13.7 16.5 12.1 18.7 13.7 12.7
Goiás 16.3 16.2 14.6 14.6 14.5 18.7 16.3





Volume of Piped Water Distributed and % Not Treated 
 
Volume of Collected Sewerage and % Not Treated 
 
 




Distributed (m3/day) Not Treated/Distributed (%) Changes (%) 1989/2000
1989 2000 1989 2000 Distributed Not Treated
Brazil 27,863,940 43,999,678 3.9 7.2 57.9 3.3
Northeast 4,837,261 7,892,876 6.0 6.4 63.2 0.5
Bahia 1,196,627 2,184,876 3.0 4.6 82.6 1.6
Maranhao 431,634 909,660 19.5 27.6 110.7 8.1
Piaui 212,027 391,143 25.4 8.0 84.5 -17.4
Ceara 615,811 951,813 4.6 7.9 54.6 3.3
Rio Grande do Norte 411,434 659,589 10.3 2.6 60.3 -7.8
Paraiba 406,701 577,532 1.8 2.4 42.0 0.6
Pernambuco 1,119,503 1,554,881 2.0 0.6 38.9 -1.4
Alagoas 237,270 345,215 1.4 2.7 45.5 1.3
Sergipe 206,254 318,167 5.8 0.0 54.3 -5.8
Source: Pesquisa Nacional de Saneamento Basico 1989 and 2000.
Collected (m3/day) Not Treated/Collected (%) Changes (%) 1989/2000
1989 2000 1989 2000 Collected Not Treated
Brazil 10,667,823 14,570,079 80.1 64.7 36.6 -15.3
Northeast 1,076,722 1,595,398 83.5 21.7 48.2 -61.7
Bahia 209,311 700,285 91.9 10.3 234.6 -81.6
Maranhao 58,984 62,454 98.4 82.1 5.9 -16.4
Piaui 3,439 17,950 52.8 0.3 422.0 -52.4
Ceara 122,126 288,031 58.7 14.4 135.8 -44.3
Rio Grande do Norte 68,406 47,854 97.7 53.8 -30.0 -43.9
Paraiba 111,088 191,503 85.8 45.3 72.4 -40.5
Pernambuco 444,529 196,019 85.2 17.1 -55.9 -68.2
Alagoas 29,702 40,930 41.0 73.6 37.8 32.6
Sergipe 28,937 50,332 73.0 11.4 73.9 -61.6
















Bahia 6,063 5,260 169 550 87% 3% 9% 1%
Northeast 24,403 21,946 1,329 550 90% 5% 2% 2%
















Bahia 10,398 5,314 871 4,090 51% 8% 39% 1%
Northeast 41,558 20,044 6,072 15,030 48% 15% 36% 1%
Brazil 228,413 48,322 84,576 82,640 21% 37% 36% 6%
Source: Pesquisa Nacional de Saneamento Basico 1989 and 2000.